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Seegers Lecture
"HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE":
A CONSTITUTIONAL  POPULIST MANIFESTO*
RICHARD  D.  PARKER"
1. INTRODUCTION
Let  me begin  at  the end.  I want  to  give  you some  sense  of where  I'm
going.  Then,  you'll  begin  to  see  where  I'm  coming  from.  I'm  going  to
challenge three basic ideas-three connected orthodoxies-central to conventional
discourse  about constitutional  law.  They  are:
(1)  The idea that we must define constitutional  democracy  as opposed  to
populist democracy:  that constitutional constraints  on public power in
a  democracy  are  meant  to  contain  or  tame  the exertion  of popular
political energy  rather than to nurture,  galvanize,  and release  it.
(2)  The related  idea that  constitutional  law is "higher"  law,  its substance
and  process  superior  to  "ordinary"  law  and  politics  not  just
functionally,  but  (somehow) in essential  quality as well.
(3)  The consequent  idea  that  the  main  mission of modem  constitutional
law is  to stand  "above  the battle"  so  as to protect  "individuals"  and
"minorities"  against the ruling  "majority."
The phrase  "Here,  the  People Rule"  is taken  from the remarks  of Gerald  Ford upon taking
the oath of office as  President-just after waving goodbye to Richard Nixon-on August  9,  1974.
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I  am  going  to  urge,  in  fact,  that  constitutional  law  should  be  devoted  as
much-and even more-to promote majority rule as to  limit it.
To challenge such basic ideas,  I've got to go to the root of the matter.  But
what  is the  root  of  the  matter?  It  is,  I  believe,  a  matter  of sensibility.  It
involves  our  assumptions,  imagination,  and  attitudes-assumptions  about,
imagination of, and attitudes toward the political energy of ordinary people.  For
that  is  the  kernel  of  democracy,  of  a  regime  in  which  offices  are  open  to
ordinary  citizens and in which ordinary people are allowed, and even expected,
to  act collectively  to influence,  and  even  control,  the government.  After  all,
democracy-its  aspirations,  its  operation,  its  dangers-is  what,  most
fundamentally,  our Constitution is about.
My  starting  point-I won't  defend it here,'  but will just start  from it-is
this:  Our  attitudes toward  the  political  energy  of ordinary  people  shape  our
sense  of what  are  the  constitutive  problems  of our  democracy.  Thus,  these
attitudes shape our notions of what should be the mission of constitutional law.
That,  in turn,  shapes our ideas about the appropriate substance of constitutional
principles  and the  proper form of reasoning  about  their  derivation,  definition,
and  application.  And  that,  in  turn,  shapes  our views  about  the  nature  and
legitimacy  of active judicial  review  in  the  name  of the  Constitution.  Taken
altogether,  then,  I  start  from  the  proposition  that  attitudes  toward  ordinary
people as  active,  energetic participants,  collectively and singly,  in politics and
government  operate both to animate and to structure  our whole discourse about
constitutional law.
How  to  get at  something  so  slippery,  so  invisible,  as  sensibility?  How,
even,  to talk about it?  The approach least  likely to self-destruct from the outset
is  an  indirect one,  a  tentative one,  respectful  of the  deeply  controversial  and
dubious status of anything said about the matter.  I won't pretend  to "prove"  or
"demonstrate"  anything.  Instead,  I'll adopt the  strategy  of a sermon-the sort
of sermon,  at any rate,  I remember  hearing as a child in the Unitarian  Church.
To  start,  I'll  try  to  inspire  you  to  inspect  and  to  question  both  your  own
sensibility and general attitudes you discern  "it) the air" of our legal and political
culture.  Only after  that will I be  more openly didactic.
1.  For  adumbrations of this approach to constitutional  law,  see Richard  D.  Parker,  The Past
of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO  ST. L.J.  223  (1981)  [hereinafter  Parker, Past of
Constitutional  Theory];  Richard  D.  Parker,  Constitutional  Voices,  in  THE  EVOLVING  U.S.
CONSTITUTION:  1787-1987 (Tung-hsun Sun ed.,  1989).  The approach will be more fully elaborated
in my book to be entitled LAW NOIR:  THE POETICS  AND POLITICS  OF CONSTITUTIONAL  ARGUMENT
(forthcoming).
532
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 [1993], Art. 1
http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss3/11993]  "HERE, THE PEOPLE  RULE"  533
II.  POLITICAL  ENERGY
If what  is  at  stake  is a  sensibility,  it  seems  to  me that  the  most  fruitful
approach  to  it might  be  through  a  work  of  fiction.  When  easing  into  any
sensitive  territory,  a traditional move,  after  all,  is to turn to a story.
The  story  I've  chosen  is Mario and the Magician, 2  written  in  1929  by
Thomas  Mann.  But you ask:  Why that one, more  than half a century  old,  by
a German,  set  in the Italy of Mussolini?  My reason  is straightforward.  It  is
"about"  politics.  Though  Mussolini  is  barely  mentioned  in  it,  it's  widely
understood  as being,  specifically,  about the  rise  of fascism.  The  editor of a
recent  anthology  of short fiction describes  it as  a  "fictional  exploration of the
dynamics  of fascism  in Mussolini's Italy."3  But  what  has  it  to  do with  our
politics?  The  fascist  episode,  I  believe,  is  still  relatively  vivid  in  our
imagination.  More important,  it evokes what  appear  to me to be  some of our
deepest, most problematic attitudes about the nature and peril of popular political
energy  in  our  own  democracy-attitudes  to  which  the  story,  then,  gives  us
access.
Getting at a "legal"  sensibility through a work of fiction, nevertheless,  has
its pitfalls and  so depends  on respect  for a couple of ground  rules.  First, we
have  to  keep  in  mind  our purpose  in  considering  this story.  Like  any  other
work  of fiction, Mario and the Magician can be approached  from all sorts of
angles;  doing  anything  like full justice  to  it  would involve  considering  all  of
them.4  Doing  full justice  to  the story,  however,  is  not  the point here.  Our
focus  must  be  fixed  on  the  issue  at  hand:  the  issue  of political  sensibility.
Second, we should avoid entanglement in arguments about competing "methods"
of interpretation.  When lawyers, in particular, confront a text,  they tend to look
for  its  "meaning"-they  assume  it  should  have  one,  most  plausible
meaning-and  they get  hung up on  issues of proper  techniques  or criteria  for
identifying  that meaning.  Thus,  approaching  fiction,  they  tend to worry  over
the  intent  of  the  author,  his  other  works  and  general  views,  the  "real"
historical-social  context,  and  so  forth.  But,  for  our  purpose,  none  of  this
matters.  We  can  forget  about  such  external  criteria  of  meaning.  For  the
meaning  of the  text-its  "correct"  interpretation-is  not  what  we  are  after.
What we are after is, rather,  our own reaction  to the story.  In that reaction,  we
2.  THOMAs MANN, Mario and the Magician, in DEATH IN VENICE AND SEVEN  OTHER STORIES
(H.T.  Lowe-Porter, trans.,  Vintage  International  1989)  [hereinafter  Mario].  Quotations from the
story will be from the translation by H.T. Lowe-Porter,  originally published in 1936 and now widely
available in a Vintage  International  Edition  (1989).  The German version was originally published
in 1929.
3.  MITCHELL COHEN,  REBELS & REACTIONARIES 235  (1992).
4.  To cite just one example:  issues of sexual identity  are plainly vital  to the story.
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seek  insight into  a sensibility.
So,  the question to ask is:  What do we make of the story?  That involves:
What  sensibility does it engage,  what  attitudes does it evoke,  in us?  And that
implicates  a  question  that will occupy  us  most:  What  is  it  in  the  story  that
works  to  evoke  our reaction?  What elements  in  it do  we  notice  and  stress?
How  do we  envision  them coming  together?  What pattern  do  we  see?  The
idea,  in  other words,  is  to use  the  story  as  a sort  of Rorschach  ink blot test.
What we are seeking  might be called  a  "reading"  of the story.  But since that
may  sound too fancy,  let's just ask:  What  is our  "take"  on it?
In fact,  I'm going to  sketch not just one take on Mario and the Magician,
but two.  They  are  different,  involving opposed  attitudes toward  the political
energy  and  activity  of  ordinary  people,  opposed  sensibilities.  Though  our
appreciation of the story will benefit if we recognize  both, that is not easy to do.
Most readers  tend to see one first, resonating  more harmoniously  to it,  maybe
having to struggle  to see  the other at all.  In  this respect,  the story works  not
simply as an ink blot test,  but as the familiar kind of "reversible  figure"  sketch
found  in basic  psychology texts:5  Our eye  perceives  it as  a duck  or a rabbit,
as  an old woman or a young woman;  the patterns are  opposed,  so it  is hard to
see both at once;  one tends to assume priority.  Later,  I'll suggest  that the first
of the "takes"  on Thomas Mann's story tends to assume a similar priority in our
minds.  The second-being  distinctly secondary-I'll  call a  "double take."
Now, let's turn to the story.  It has two parts.  In the first part,  consuming
about a  third of the whole, the narrator-Northern  European, apparently  upper
middle class-arrives  in August to  vacation  in Torre di  Venere,  a small resort
town on the Italian coast.  With him are his wife and two young children.  They
stay a few days in the Grand  Hotel and then move to a smaller pensione.  They
endure unpleasant  episodes on the beach.  In the second part,  the narrator  and
his  family  go  to what  is advertised as  a magic show by  a man named  Cipolla.
The rest of the story is about the show.  It turns out that  Cipolla is a hypnotist
adept  at  manipulating  people  from  his  audience.  His  manipulation  becomes
more and more intrusive and humiliating as the show proceeds,  finally climaxing
in his hypnosis of Mario,  a young waiter.  Cipolla gets Mario  to  address  him
in  the name  of the woman  he  loves,  and  then  to  kiss him,  blissfully,  on the
cheek.  Snapped  out  of his trance,  Mario-horrified-fires  a  gun at  Cipolla.
Cipolla  crumples  to  the floor.  The narrator  and his  family  move  toward  the
exit.  The police arrive.  The story ends.
5.  E.g.,  PATRICK  CAVANAGH,  What's Up  in Top-Down Processing, in REPRESENTATIONS  OF
VISIONS:  TRENDS  & TACIT  ASSUMPTIONS  IN  VISION  RESEARCH  295  (Andrei Gorea  et  al.  eds.,
1991);  IRVIN  ROCK,  PERCEPTION  120-23  (1984);  RITA  L.  ATKINSON  ET  AL.,  INTRODUCTION  TO
PSYCHOLOGY  172 (1990);  R.L. GREGORY,  EYE  AND  BRAIN  10-11  (1966).
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The focus of most readers  is on  the longer,  more  florid second  part of the
story.  But,  if the  story  contains  any  unambiguous  instruction  for  its  own
reading,  it  is  this:  the  second  part  is  some  sort  of  echo  of  the  first.  Up
front-in the very first paragraph-the  narrator draws a frame around  the story.
"From  the first moment,"  he states,  "the  air of the place made  us uneasy  ...
then  at  the  end  came  the  shocking  business  of  Cipolla  ...who  seemed  to
incorporate.  . . all the evilness of the situation as a whole."  An  issue that any
take on the story will seek to resolve, then,  is:  What is the relationship between
the two parts of the story?  What broad pattern  do they  form?  Which is to say:
In what does  the "evilness  of the situation as  a whole" consist?6
Now,  I'm  going  to  sketch  one  and  then  the  other  take  by  "telling"  the
story,  emphasizing  certain episodes,  quoting certain lines,  and commenting  on
certain problems and patterns and attitudes as  I go along.  Of course,  there's no
substitute for reading  the story yourself-and  considering your own  reaction to
it-before going  on to what  I  have to say.  In  fact,  I urge you  stop right here
and  do just that.
A.  The First "Take"
"The  atmosphere  of  Torre  di  Venere,"  begins  the  narrator,  "remains
unpleasant in the memory."  It "made"  him feel  "irritable,  on edge."  From the
outset,  the  focus  is  on  the  general,  unhealthy  condition  of  the  place.  This
arouses  our curiosity:  What was wrong with  Torre  di Venere?
In  the next paragraphs,  we get an answer.  Torre is a place  vacationers go
to  seeking  very  specific values-"peace,"  "quiet,"  a  "refuge,"  an  "idyll,"  a
"contemplative,"  "refined"  atmosphere.  But, now,  such qualities have "ceased
to be evident."  They are  eclipsed  by something else-"the world,"  crowds  of
people  who are  "rushing,"  "seek[ing]  peace  and  put[ting] her  to  flight."  In
summer,  the  crowd  "swarms"  over  the  beach.  Its  "screaming,  squabbling,
merrymaking"-heightened  by  "anxious  cries"  of  mothers  and  "breathy,
full-throated"  shouts  of "pedlars  [sic]"-"fill  the air."  The  narrator  is  under
attack.  Even  the  sun  "blazing  down  like  mad,  peels  the  skin."  But  what,
exactly,  is  attacking  him?  It  is:  the  noise,  activity-energy-emitted  by  a
crowd.  Later,  the narrator employs a military metaphor.  The "field,"  he says,
was  "occupied."  By  what  enemy?  He  characterizes  it  simply  as  "the  great
public."  A  mob of "ordinary  humanity.'
The narrator and his family  take up residence  in the Grand  Hotel.  There,
6.  Mario, supra note  2,  at  133.  Rather than having  a  proliferation of citations for every  line
I quote,  I'll drop  a footnote  every few  paragraphs to chart my progress through the story.
7.  Id.  at  133-35,  138.
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two  brief  episodes  ensue.  They  are  similar.  Both  involve  an  utterly
unreasonable  use  of  power.  In  both,  the  narrator  is  made  to  suffer.  In
counterpoint  to the  "atmosphere"  of anxiety-against  the  background  noise  of
the invasive crowd-these  two episodes sharpen  the sense of "evil"  adumbrated
at the  start,  mixing  with the anarchic  energy  of the mob  the kick  of arbitrary
authority.
The narrator  asks,  first,  to dine in a protected  spot, a  "cozy  nook"  out on
a  veranda  "over  the  water,"  where  "little  red-shaded  lamps  glowed"  on  the
tables.  As  ever,  he is after  privacy,  peace,  and quiet.  But he is  "informed"
that  the  veranda  is  reserved  for  "clients"  of  the  hotel.  This  is,  of course,
nonsense.  The narrator and his family were clients, boarding for several weeks.
Without justification,  they are  forced to go into the  "common light" of the  big
dining room,  to eat  "ordinary  and monotonous"  food amidst  the crowd.
Shortly  thereafter,  a  favored  client  in  the  room  next  to  the  narrator's
complains  about his child's coughing,  "clinging  to the widely  held view"  that
the  condition  may  be  "acoustically  contagious."  Accepting  this  absurd
complaint,  the manager  tells the narrator to move to "the annexe."  The narrator
answers unreason  with reason.  What he gains is the opportunity to present  his
case  to  the  hotel  physician.  The doctor  behaves  like  an  "honest  servant  of
science."  He says there is "no  danger of contagion."  Drawing "a long breath,"
the narrator imagines "the incident closed."  But it is not. 'The  manager dictates
that,  despite the medical verdict, they still must move.  The narrator labels this
"Byzantinism,"  a "wilful breach  of faith."  It  "outraged us,"  he concludes.'
He  and  his  family  move to a  smaller pensione  to escape  the  contagion  of
crowded,  overbearing  irrationality in the air of the Grand Hotel.  He escapes to
find peace:  clear boundaries securing  individual autonomy,  dignity, and reason.
The  cozy  rooming  house has  a  "clean,  cool"  dining  room  where  "the  service
was attentive and good."  "[A]II  seemed  for the best,"  says the narrator.  "And
yet,"  he continues,  "no proper gratification ensued."  The sort of peace he seeks
is not  to be found  in Torre.  The evil,  he complains,  "pursued  us."
The  narrator  begins  to  name  the evil:  "the  naive  misuse  of power,  the
injustice,  the sycophantic corruption."  He associates it with energy:  the  light,
the heat.  He  describes  "the  enormous  naivet6 of the unrefracted  light."  He
depicts  himself  assaulted  by  "[t]he  power  of  the  sun  . . . so  frightful,  so
relentless."  Finally,  he portrays what is "pursuing"  him in fundamental  terms:
"collisions with ordinary  humanity."
8.  Id.  at  135-37.
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In  the heat,  the narrator and his family seek relief on the beach  and,  there,
"collisions"  escalate.  They are  "surrounded"  by a big crowd of "very  average
humanity-a middle-class mob" whose aggressive, chaotic noise bombards them.
One  day, the noise is amplified to an "uproar" when a "repulsive"  boy is bitten
by a sand-crab.  His cries and his mother's "tragic  appeals"  draw an audience.
A  doctor-the same one-appears.  As a  "man  of science,"  he says  the boy is
not  hurt.  But  the crowd-like  the  manager  of the  Grand  Hotel-ignores  the
voice of reason.  The boy is "borne off the beach,"  mob  in tow.  The next day,
he is back, "spoiling our children's sand-castles.  Of course,  always by accident.
[A] perfect  terror,"  says the narrator,  under siege.
Finally,  the narrator comes  "to blows"  with his tormentors.  His little girl
removes  her  bathing  suit  on  the  beach  so  as  to  rinse  it  out.  There  is  an
"outburst  of  anger  and  resentment"  from  the  crowd.  "[W]e  became,"  the
narrator notes,  "an  offence to the public morals."  Children  hoot and whistle.
With  "overheated"  eloquence,  a  "gentleman"  demands  "punitive  measures."
The  basic  energy,  the  "emotionalism  of the sense-loving  south,"  mobilizes  to
insist  on  "morality  and  discipline."  The  narrator  answers  with  calm,  polite
reason.  The mob  ignores him.  He  and his family  "must  be made  an example
of."  The  mob  calls  on  "the  authorities."  An  official  pronounces  the  case
"'molto grave."'  He  commands  them  to go  to the town hall.  There,  a higher
official  subjects them  to  "a  stream of the usual  didactic phrases-the  selfsame
tune and words" used earlier by the "gentleman"  in the crowd.  He confirms the
"'molto grave"' verdict.  And he levies on  them a  fine;  the narrator  calls  it  a
"ransom."
Elements  of  the  story  that  were  in  counterpoint  are  now,  in  the  two
incidents  on  the beach,  melded  together.  At the Grand  Hotel,  one motif-the
energy of the crowds of people "invading"  the town-lay, as a backdrop, behind
the other-the arbitrary use of power by  the hotel management.  On  the beach,
the  energy  of  the  crowd  lies  behind the  use  of power by  town officials  in  a
deeper  sense.  There  is a basic  affinity between the two.  The crowd's energy
seems  to  fuel,  even  to  generate,  the arbitrary  exercise  of power.  When  the
official  exacts  a fine from  the narrator,  his action repeats-in  its  exaggeration
of a trivial  event,  its obliviousness  to  reason-the crowd's  exaggeration  of the
sand-crab  bite,  oblivious to  the  diagnosis of  the doctor.  He  gives  the  same
speech  as  the  gentleman  in  the  crowd.  And,  what  is  more,  he  demands
"ransom"  in direct response  to the crowd's  demand.
Toward  the  end of the first part of the story,  the narrator  remarks on  the
"political"  nature of the energy-heated,  emotional,  ignorant,  aggressive,  and
oppressive-that  animates  the  "ordinary  humanity"  of  the  town.  He  says,
"[W]e were  in the presence  of a national  ideal."  He views the beach  as "alive
with patriotic  children,"  and he  continues:  "There  were  quarrels  over  flags,
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disputes about authority and precedence.  Grown-ups joined in,  not so much  to
pacify  as to render judgment and enunciate  principles."  Noting that "[p]hrases
were dropped about the greatness and dignity of Italy,"  he identifies the passion
of nationalism,  of patriotism,  as  an  "illness"  spread  among  the people.9
Already,  one-third into the story,  much of the nightmare of fascism-mass
energy  arm-in-arm  with  abuse  of  power,  suppression  of  disfavored,
nonconforming  individuals,  free-floating  pugnacity,  all  in the name of a group
identity-has  been  enacted.  Only  the  charismatic  leader-figure  has  yet  to
appear.  And he may not be so central after all.  For, as the narrator says at the
start, he simply "incorporate[d].  . . all the evilness of the situation as a whole."
Now,  Cipolla announces himself.  Advertising himself, misleadingly,  as a
mere  entertainer,  he  draws  a  big audience,  all  too ready  to be  drawn  in  and
misled.  The people, joined by the narrator and his  family,  arrive at the hall on
time.  Cipolla makes  them wait,  asserting his dominance  from the start.  When
he  finally appears,  though,  he  seems not so much  to dominate  the crowd  as  to
tap into-give vent to-the ill-omened passions that already  were agitating  it.
The narrator notes not only what is odd in his appearance-"piercing  eyes,"
formal  outfit  and  hunchbacked  deformity.  He  also notices  Cipolla's  "cross-
grained pride,"  "self-satisfied  air,"  and "energy"-characteristics  that he shares
with  the  ordinary  people  of the  town  and  that  thereby  begin  to  intimate  the
bonds of kinship between him and them.  Almost immediately,  he mobilizes  the
energy  of  the  people  in  a  project  of  subjugation-their  own  subjugation,
something they may have been yearning for secretly,  something they are surely
suited  for.  A  young  man  dressed  in  the  "style  . . . of  the  awakened
Fatherland"-that is, one of the patriotic mob-speaks up to wish Cipolla a good
evening.  Cipolla responds,  "'I  like you  . . . . People  like you are just in my
line.'"  Then he continues:  "'You do what you like.  Or is it possible you have
ever not done what you liked ....  What somebody else liked,  in short?  Hark
ye,  my friend,  that might be a pleasant change  for you, to divide up  the willing
and  the doing  . . . ."'  At  that,  Cipolla  tells the  young  man  to  stick  out his
tongue "'right  down  to the roots."'  The youth resists.  Cipolla  then makes his
claw-handled  riding whip "whistle once through the air."  The youth  shows his
tongue.  And  Cipolla  says,  "'That  was  me."'  Thus  boundaries  between
individuals  collapse.  The  group  psychology  of  the  mob  gestates  its  own
belligerent will,  giving it birth embodied  in a  leader who turns it back against
the people themselves-and  the people approve  him.
Cipolla,  the  narrator  says,  "won  his  audience."  He  attributes  Cipolla's
9.  Id. at  137-42.
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success partly  to his "constant  flow of words,"  operating to  "eliminate  the gap
between stage and audience,  which had already been bridged over by the curious
skirmish"  with the young man.  "The mother tongue,"  he says,  is the "national
cement."  Rhetoric-rather  than  reason-moves  and  merges  the  people.
Cipolla's  rhetoric  reflects  to  the  audience  its  own  personality.  The
"thin-skinnedness  and  animosity"  of  his  bluster  fascinates  them.  Cipolla
launches  into  patriotic  speeches,  echoing  the earlier  ones  by  the  mob  on  the
beach.  When a man, called to the stage,  confesses he cannot write,  Cipolla calls
that  "'scandalous."'  "'In  Italy  everybody  can  write,"  he  proclaims.  To
"'accuse"'  Italy of harboring  an illiterate is to "'humiliate  the government and
the  whole  country  as  well.'"  Marking  Cipolla's  "patriotism"  and  "irritable
sense  of dignity,"  the narrator  says that  his "countrymen"  in  the audience  felt
"in  their element with  all that."'
Twice  before  the  intermission,  individuals  in  the  audience  challenge
Cipolla, each aspiring  to assert  his  "own  will."  Hypnotically,  Cipolla subdues
them,  his  whip  cutting  the  air,  leaving  one  "all  but  grovell[ing]  upon  the
ground."  The narrator  feels a  "stream  of influence"  moving not  simply  from
Cipolla  to  the  crowd,  but  vice  versa  as  well.  Cipolla,  he  feels,  acted  "in
obedience to  a voiceless common  will"  in  the air.  Cipolla  touts his  "capacity
for self-surrender"  to the people, asserting that  "[clommanding and obeying" are
"one  indissoluable  unity."  "[P]eople  and  leader  [are]  comprehended  in  one
another,"  he proclaims.  The applause by the audience for Cipolla was,  by now,
"like a patriotic demonstration.  1
When,  after the intermission, the show resumes, the ugliness of the political
energy  coursing  back  and  forth  between  the  crowd  and  Cipolla  intensifies.
Cipolla  launches  into  "attacks"  on  autonomy,  rationality,  morality-many  of
them  "monstrous"  and  "grotesque"-as  the  people  "laugh[]  and  applaud[]."
Hypnotizing the narrator's  landlady to leave  her husband and come  to him,  he
exhorts  the  husband  to  recognize  "'powers  stronger  than  reason  or virtue."'
Increasingly,  he pauses to drink from a glass of liquor, pouring "fuel,"  says the
narrator,,upon  "his  demoniac fires."  Intoxicated-and intoxicating-he appeals
to the people:  "'I  am the person  who  is suffering,  I am the one to be pitied."'
The narrator-by now, apparently the only cool head in a febrile mob-notes the
peculiarity of eliciting compassion  for  "a  man  who is  suffering to  bring  about
the humiliation of others."
Building  to  a  climax,  Cipolla  calls  a  group  to  the  stage  and  sets  them
dancing-"dissolute,  abandoned"  in  "drunken  abdication  of the critical  spirit."
10.  Id. at  144-59.
11.  Id. at  156-64.
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A couple of young men volunteer as subjects.  An "ecstatic  youth" who "gloried
in  the model  facility he had  in  losing consciousness"  falls,  at a  look,  "into  a
state  of  military  somnambulism,"  "pleased  to  be  relieved  of  the  burden  of
voluntary  choice."  Another,  a  "gentleman,"  challenges  Cipolla  to make  him
dance.  "'[Y]our  arms  and  legs  are  aching  for it,'" Cipolla  intones.  And,  in
short order, the man is dancing with his eyes  "half shut,"  a "broad grin"  on his
face,  "having a better time than in his hour of pride."  Cipolla's "triumph,"  the
narrator observes,  was at  "its height,"  his whip like "Circe's wand"-and,  by
implication,  his audience like Circe's crowd  of swine. 2
At  last,  Cipolla calls  on Mario.  He  gives  Mario  the  "Roman"-that  is,
fascist-salute.  He  feigns  tender  sympathy  for  Mario,  luring  him  into  shy
conversation,  trust,  vulnerability,  and  finally  intimacy.  Tapping  the  young
man's unrequited love for a girl,  he speaks in her name,  appealing for Mario to
express  his hidden passion.  "'Trust  me,  I love thee.  Kiss me  here,'"  he says.
Mario  kisses  Cipolla.  This  is  "the  moment  of  Mario's  bliss"-"an  utter
abandonment  of the inmost soul, a public exposure of ...  deluded passion and
rapture."  The  narrator  characterizes  it  as  "monstrous,"  "grotesque  and
thrilling."  All protective barriers now seem to be down.  Someone in the mob
laughs.  Cipolla's whip cracks.  Mario snaps out of his trance,  holds his hands
over his "desecrated  lips,"  then he "beat[s]  his temples with his clenched  fists."
He turns and draws  a gun.  Two  shots crash  "through  applause and laughter."
Cipolla  collapses,  a  "heap  of  clothing,  with  limbs  awry."  Chaos  ensues.
People  run to  Mario,  flinging themselves  on him to  take away  the  gun.  The
narrator calls their behavior,  yet again,  that of "a  mob."
As  the police enter,  the narrator exits with his  family.  In the last  lines of
the  story,  he  sets  out  his  verdict:  It  was  an  "end  of horror."  It  was  "a
liberation."  While the  mob  of  ordinary  people  had  no  use  for,  and  indeed
trampled  on,  individuality-on  reason  and  virtue,  restraint  and  dignity-one
individual did stand apart,  one did stand up and so put an "end"  to the "horror."
Who  was  it?  Was  it  Mario?  An  ordinary  person  pushed  farther  than  the
others-his  privacy  too  intimately  invaded-who,  then,  broke  loose  from  the
mob?  Or was Mario,  described as  "melancholy,"  more than ordinary  from the
start?  A romantic,  alienated  sort of person?  A rebel?  Or was the individual
who  stood apart and acted  as an  individual someone else altogether?  What  of
the narrator himself?  He most  fully embodies reason and virtue.  He is the one
who keeps a distance not only from  Cipolla,  but from Cipolla's spiritual  kin as
well-the people of Torre.  Mario's  bullets,  moreover,  will not "end"  the real
"horror":  the  "evilness of the situation as a whole."  The narrator  is  the one
who grasps that.  He gets out of the place.  That is the only "end"  to the horror.
12.  Id. at  166-71.
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And the only  "liberation." 3
To  be  sure,  power-animated  by  the  fever  of  the  mobilized  mass  of
"average  humanity"-has,  at  the  end,  been  checked.  But  it  took  an  act  of
desperation,  a violent act.  Really,  we  are  safe  only if a  check  by  reason  on
power-by  law on the  febrile  political energy of ordinary  people-is built into
institutions that  give power expression.
That  is one  take on  the story.
B.  The Second  "Take"
To shift your perception  for a second take-to do a "double  take"-on the
story,  one simple adjustment  is required.  The adjustment is of a sort perfectly
familiar in old-fashioned literary criticism.  It involves the status of the narrator.
The  first  take  adopts  his point  of  view,  empathizing  with  his  sense  of  the
problem,  his estimation of"the evilness of the situation as a whole."  A  second
take simply shifts to look at the narrator as the problem-as  a central part of the
"evilness  of the situation."  That  shift produces  others,  emphasizing  different
aspects of the story,  exposing different patterns  in it and evoking very different
attitudes  toward  the political  energy of ordinary  people.
The opening of the story strikes  two  notes.  One  is the  dissonant note  of
"peace"  threatened  by crowds  of vacationers.  The other is  relatively muffled.
It is a note of more personal  lament.  Specifically,  the narrator  laments  that his
young children  "had to be  present"  at  "the horrible end of the affair."  How is
it that the children  "had"  to be present?  He goes on  to say that  their presence
was "due to"  Cipolla's false advertising of his show.  But should that be the end
of the matter?  Or  does his way  of skimming  over his  own responsibility  as a
parent  suggest,  even  so early  in the  story,  a passivity-problematic  passivity?
In  his  lament,  the  narrator  thus  casts  suspicion  on  his  desire  for  "peace."
"Luckily,"  he says,  the children  did not grasp what  went on,  so  "we  let  them
remain  in their happy belief"-their phony peace.  Is the "peace"  for which the
narrator yearns  so very different?  Or is it, too,  a peace of disengagement  from
the world and the people  around  him, a peace  of passivity?
In  the next few paragraphs,  the narrator  draws  three distinctions  between
himself and the mob crowding into the town.  First, he describes  them as  being
"southern,"  as opposed  to his  "northern"  self.  He  complains  not only of the
noise,  the  "breathy,  full-throated  southern  voice[s],"  but also of the  "garish"
boats, the "repulsive,"  dusty buses.  Second,  this rather prissy distinction of the
13.  Id. at  172-78.
Parker: "Here, the People Rule":  A Constitutional Populist Manifesto
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993542  VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  27
boorish  southerner  from  the  more  refined  northerner  plays  into  a  class
distinction.  The town, he says, was once enjoyed by "the few,"  but people who
"own  or rent the villas.  . . no longer have ...  their  own way"  in the place.
He  feels  "temporarily  dgclasse" amid  the crowds.  And,  third,  he  puts down
what  he  describes  as  the  "national"  quality  of  the  vacationing
masses-identifying himself, by contrast,  as a cosmopolitan,  detached from,  and
superior to, any agglutination of humans.  He calls himself a "stranger."  And,
certainly,  his  estrangement  and  his  passivity  reinforce  each  other,  finding
expression  in his haughty disdain  for  the active  life of the  town,  and  for  the
people who lead it. 4
On  second  take,  what  is  most  remarkable  about  the  events at  the Grand
Hotel is  not the use of power by  the management-not  its political energy-but
the passivity,  the absence of political  energy on  the part of the  narrator.  He
turns up  his  nose  at  the  "ordinary"  food  and  the  "common"  light in  the  big
dining room,  but does not argue  when forced  to sit there.  "[W]e  forbore,"  he
remarks,  "to  press  for an explanation."  A  sign,  no  doubt,  of good breeding.
When the manager  throws him and his family out of their  room, he does argue
a bit, but passes the buck  to the hotel's doctor.  And when the manager  ignores
the  doctor's view,  he  is  "outraged"-what  does  he  then do?  He  turns  tail.
"[W]e  preferred  to  leave,"  he says.  He lacks the political energy to engage  in
a struggle for power.  Even more,  he seems  to  disdain it.
Moving to the small pensione,  the narrator is content for a time.  And what
pleases him there?  The place, he says,  is "cool"  and "clean" -isolated  from the
heat and dirt of the town full of people.  In the very same sentence,  he remarks
that  the  "service"  at  the  pensione  was  "attentive  and  good."  Indeed,  all  he
requires  from ordinary people,  it would appear,  is good "service"-and a good
distance.
That,  of  course,  is  just  what  he  does  not  get.  As  he  bemoans  his
"collisions" with ordinary humanity on the beach and complains of the "power"
of the sun, he elaborates  his basic  scorn for the people themselves.  He portrays
them as  "middle  class";  "very  average";  a "mob."  He makes  fun of mothers
calling their  kids:  "The voices  these women  have!"  It's not simply the noise
that "vex[es]"  his "sensitive soul,"  but the "harsh,"  "hideously stressed"  tones.
What  impresses  him about  one  child  is  his  "ill-breeding."  He  calls  the boy
"repulsive."  Even the weather seems to him childish,  "dull"  and spoiled  by an
"enormous  naYvet6"  that cannot  satisfy  his "deeper  . . . complex"  soul.  The
"light-heartedness"  that it induces  among southerners  is not  for him.  He feels
"barren"  and  "a  little contemptuous."  His contempt inspires  a mocking  motif
14.  Id. at  133-35,  139.
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that reappears  later on.  "[I]t  is,"  he says,  "classic  weather,  the sun of Homer,
the climate  wherein  human culture  came  to  flower-and  all  the rest of it."  It
amuses  him to  speak,  ironically,  of ordinary  people  and  their surroundings in
terms  of classic antiquity.  So,  he compares  the cries of the  "repulsive"  boy to
"the shout of an antique hero."  And,  as to the tone of the mothers'  voices,  he
sneers that it was "sometimes  hard to believe that we were in the land which is
the western  cradle  of the art  of song.""
When the narrator proceeds  to complain about the patriotism of the people
on  the  beach,  his  condescension  congeals.  Imagining  them as  "just passing
through  a  certain  stage,  something  rather  like  an  illness,"  he  illustrates  his
penchant to look at the town's adults as children or unruly adolescents.  He says
that  his  own  children  were  so  "puzzled  and  hurt"  by  the  people's  childish
demeanor  that they simply "retreat[ed]"  from it.  But was that not his response
as well?  Like his children,  might not he also be behaving childishly?  Another
of his condescensions  has  the  same  brittle  reflexive  quality.  He  scorns  the
people's  "stiffness,"  their  "lack  of innocent  enjoyment";  they  "stood  on their
dignity,"  he says.  Isn't all that very true,  once again,  of his own lofty self?
In the conflict over his daughter's  lack  of a bathing  suit, the connections
among  the narrator's  disdain for  "average  humanity,"  his  "stiff dignity,"  and
his tendency to  "puzzled  retreat"  come to the surface.  When the crowd on the
beach  makes  its objection  to public nudity, he dismisses  this view out of hand.
Smugly,  he states that "our attitude towards the nude body" has "undergone,  all
over the world, a fundamental change."  The cosmopolitan standard of behavior,
valuing  "freedom"  in the matter,  is superior,  he assumes,  to any local standard.
He simply  derides the people's attitude as backward  and ignorant-attributing it
to "emotionalism" and  "morality."  No wonder, then,  that his efforts to answer
the crowd  on  his child's behalf strike no chords.  He cannot  begin to relate  to
them.  He claims  to  have had  arguments  on  the tip of his tongue.  (Naturally,
the  "answers"  he thought  of are  haughty,  sarcastic  put-downs.)  But what  he
comes  out with  are  minimal  "mitigating"  apologies,  offered  with irony.  He
"bow[s]  respectfully."  And when fined,  he says he "paid,  and left."  He cannot
bring himself even to enter the arena,  much  less put up  any kind of fight.
His last  word on  the  episode  accentuates  the problem:  a problem  not of
invasive  energy,  but of an  absence of energy.  "Ought we not at this point to
have left Torre  . . .?"  he muses.  And he answers himself:  "If we only had!"
"But,"  he shrugs  feebly,  "circumstances  combined  to prevent us  from making
up our minds  to a change."1
6
15.  Id. at  135-39.
16.  Id. at  140-42.
Parker: "Here, the People Rule":  A Constitutional Populist Manifesto
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993544  VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY  LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  27
What  has  happened-the  story  makes  clear-is  a  failure  of will.  The
narrator  canvasses  a  potpourri  of  rationalizations  for  it-dignity,  curiosity,
stoicism,  and even indolence.  But the critical point is that here,  before  Cipolla
comes on the scene,  the story shows that it does not take a hypnotist-or fascist
leader-to induce a failure of will.  What is more,  the failure of will established
here at the center of the story is not that of ignorant,  ordinary people.  It is that
of one  who thinks himself their superior-who  mocks  their  energy;  who fears
and loathes involvement in any  hot, messy,  risky political  contest;  whose  own
energy  is  primly  embalmed  in  a  refined  and  elevated  dependence  upon
"rationality"  and  privacy and peace.
When Cipolla's performance  is advertised,  this theme,  essential  to the first
third  of  the  story,  reappears.  The  narrator  says  that,  upon  noticing  the
advertisement,  his  children  "besieged"  him  to  go  to  the  show.  He  "had
doubts."  And he "gave way"-of course.  Thus a bridge  is built into the rest
of the story where  the narrator's dignified absence  of energy  is but one part of
a more complex  composition.
As  he  and  his  family  walk  to  the hall  for  the performance,  the narrator
describes  their path explicitly  in terms of social  class.  Passing under the wall
of the  ruined  palace,  along  a  street  with  the  "better  shops"  and  then  into  a
neighborhood  of "poor  fishing-huts,"  he  proceeds  "from  the feudal,  past the
bourgeois into the proletarian."  The hall, he says, was "among the proletariat."
And,  inside the hall,  class distinctions persist.  The bourgeoisie take their seats
up  front  while  the  "fisherfolk"-later,  the  narrator  calls  them  just  "the
populace"-stand.  To  this  point,  the  story  has  tended  to  soft-pedal  social
divisions.  It has  stressed,  instead,  temperamental  cleavages,  associated  with
differences of nationality and geography.  But now, abruptly,  the social divisions
are sharply  emphasized as well.
As  the  audience  waits  for  Cipolla  to  appear,  the  narrator  extends  his
remarks  on the topic.  Referring  to the sundry  "fisherfolk"-"rough-and-ready
youths  with bare  forearms  crossed  over their striped jerseys"-he says  that  he
was  "pleased"  with the "colour and animation"  they brought  the occasion.  His
children's reaction  is notably different.  They are  "frankly  delighted"  to see the
fisherfolk in the hall.  For they know them.  They have  spoken Italian  to them.
They  have helped  pull in their  nets.  They  actually have  "friends  among these
people."  Bridging the social  gulf, the  children point up its breadth;  for  their
connection  to  "the  populace"  reveals,  by  contrast,  the  narrator's  prissy
disconnection. 7
17.  Id. at  144-45,  153.
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When,  at last,  Cipolla appears  on  stage,  the narrator  remarks  on his weird
appearance,  comparing  him to a bygone  "charlatan  and  mountebank  type."  Is
Cipolla,  then,  a unique  figure,  an alien?  Or  does  he resonate  with-taking to
a ghastly,  dramatic point-other figures  and events and tendencies  in the story?
In  the first take on  the story,  Cipolla is  seen  as enacting  dangerous tendencies
already revealed  in the "ordinary  humanity"  of the town.  What is noticed is his
kinship  not  only  to  the  crowd,  but  to  officials  of  the  Grand  Hotel  and  the
municipality  as well.  In the second  take,  a wholly  different pattern  of kinship
comes  to  the fore.  What now  appears  is  Cipolla's  affinity  with  the narrator
himself.
Introducing  Cipolla,  the  narrator  notes  his  "self-satisfied  air  so
characteristic  of the deformed."  Ask yourself:  Which other figure  in the story
would you imagine as "self-satisfied"?  Which  "deformed"?  Might it not be the
narrator  who comes  to  mind?  In  fact,  evidence  of the kinship  between  them
mounts up  right away.  As  Cipolla  finishes with his first subject,  the narrator
reports on his "mock[ing]"  tone to the young man-reminiscent of the narrator's
own way of speaking about the local  people.  Like the narrator,  Cipolla remarks
on  his  "sensitiv[ity]"  to  insults and says  he wishes  to be  treated  "courteously"
by  the people.  "'I am a man who  sets some  store by himself,"'  he says.  He
prides  himself on  the  respect  he  has  won  "among  the  educated  public,"  and
from  "brilliant  and  elevated  audiences,"  another  point  of  haughty  affinity
between  the two of them.  It is,  he  continues,  "'with  my  mental  and  spiritual
parts  that  I  conquer  life-which  after  all  only  means  conquering  oneself."'
Here,  yet  again,  he places  himself alongside  the  narrator,  in  contrast  to  the
unself-disciplined and  sense-loving  people of the town. 8
As  the  show  goes  on,  Cipolla's  bond  to  the  narrator  becomes  clearer.
Cipolla  takes  "care  not  to  molest  the  more  select  portion  of  his  audience."
Picking  upon  "two  sturdy young  louts,"  he  remarks  on "their heroic  firmness
of limb"  in just the  sort of ironic  classical  reference  favored  by  the narrator.
He is  "elaborately  patient  and  chivalrous"  to  fancy  foreigners;  but  he  shows
only  "derogatory"  courtesy  to  the natives.  Indeed,  most  of Cipolla's  patter,
patriotic and otherwise,  is an extended,  ironic put-down of the crowd.  What he
is doing, in effect, is giving a rambling version of the speech  the narrator claims
to  have  had  on  the  tip of his  tongue,  but failed  to  deliver  to  the  mob  on  the
beach.
Behind  this  disdain  is  social  distance  and  an  assumption-Cipolla's,  the
narrator's-of  social  as  well  as  "mental  and  spiritual"  power  over  "the
populace."  At one point,  echoing earlier  remarks of the narrator,  Cipolla  says
18.  Id.  at  147-51.
Parker: "Here, the People Rule":  A Constitutional Populist Manifesto
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993546 VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY  LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  27
that a young  man's big hands are  "calculated"  to  do  "service  for  the public."
Returning the echo, the narrator notices a man he recognizes  in the crowd who,
he  simply  observes,  "had  served  us  several  times,  with  neatness  and
dispatch." 9
Cipolla,  to be sure,  likes to wield  power.  The narrator just likes to have
it.  Or, perhaps more precisely,  Cipolla abuses power, whereas the narrator just
wants to use it in a nearly invisible,  taken-for-granted,  manner.  The difference
is  important.  Still,  the vital point here  is that much  of the sentiment  driving
Cipolla  in wielding power over  the crowd  is incipient in the narrator.  Cipolla
simply  carries  it  to  an  extreme.  Indeed,  early  in  the  evening,  the  narrator
seems,  briefly,  to  sense  the affinity  between  them.  He  says  that,  as  Cipolla
brandished  his whip,  "involuntarily  I made  with  my  lips the  sound  that  [the]
whip had made when it cut the air."20
A while later,  of course,  the narrator starts  to evolve a distaste for Cipolla.
He  describes  his  skill  as  "uncanny."  He  sees  that  it  profanes  the  sort  of
rationality  to  which  he  is  wedded.  He  begins  to  understand  Cipolla  as  a
challenge.  Twice,  one hotheaded  young worker-the one who is dressed in the
style of  "the  awakened  Fatherland" -does  step  forward  to  resist,  even  rebel.
Twice,  Cipolla subdues,  then humiliates  him.  But,  remarkably,  on neither of
the two occasions does the narrator even muse about stepping forward with him.
He  recognizes  the  youth's  "fighting  spirit."  But he  thus only  illuminates his
own lack-even  in imagination-of that spirit, even as Reason  and Freedom are
embattled.  On  the  beach  and  at  the  Grand  Hotel,  the  narrator  considered
resistance-and  made  a  couple  of dignified  little gestures  toward  it.  Here,
however,  there is nothing.  How come?
That question arises alongside another.  For, while the narrator is dormant,
the crowd  is passive  as well.  But with a difference.  The narrator  reports that
"ill  will"  and desire to  resist  were  rising among  the  crowd.  He  reports  that
"rebellion"  was in the air.  And he goes on to pose the issue:  What was it that
"kept  such feelings  in check"?  The issue  he doesn't raise is:  Why  was it that
he did not share  even  these rebellious "feelings"  of the crowd?
He speculates that what kept "rebellion  from becoming overt"  was not only
Cipolla's  skill  as  a  hypnotist.  It  was  also  his  "courtesy"  and  "stern
self-confidence."  How  could  courtesy  and  confidence  overcome  the
rebelliousness of the crowd?  Could the same qualities of bearing somehow have
made the narrator  even  more completely  passive?  The answer  has  to do  with
19.  Id. at  153-57.
20.  Id. at  150.
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social hierarchy,  with the matter of social class introduced earlier.  The working
"populace"  had  been trained to  submit  to the self-confident demeanor  of their
"betters";  to stifle feelings  of rebellion and solidarity with each other.  Formal
"derogatory"  courtesy signaled authority that they were in the habit of obeying.
The narrator  sensed  the same  signals.  But,  from  the other side of the  social
divide, he  received  a different message.  Cipolla's demeanor was by habit  his
own.  It  was,  quite  plausibly,  out  of  the  question  for  him  even  to  "feel"
rebellion  against  the  representation  of himself.  The  "populace"  is something
from which he had defined himself as distant,  superior.  He could  not begin  to
join the "ordinary people"-including the noisy, unrefined  young man  with his
"'heart  at the end of his tongue' "-in  any kind of active  solidarity,  in any kind
of common cause.
2
1
A bit later, a young gentleman,  an Italian,  rises to resist Cipolla and "assert
his  own  will."  Although  the  narrator  admires  his  "proud,  finely  chiselled
features,"  even now he does not join the resistance.  Calling the young man an
"apostle  of freedom,"  he  shows  that his  own isolation  is  rooted  not  only  in
estrangement  from  "ordinary  people"-and  from  southerners  in general-but
also  in  his very  idea  of  "freedom."  The  narrator  lauds  this  man  because  he
stands alone to assert,  very coolly,  his autonomy as an individual.  But Cipolla
subdues him  as he had the workingman.  He says:  "Freedom exists,  and also
the will exists; but freedom of the will does not exist, for a will that aims [only]
at  its  own  freedom  aims  at  the  unknown."  In  this  strangely  abstract
formulation-which thus demands attention-Cipolla is flatly stating an important
insight.  The capacity-the energy-to  assert  and resist power  can only  decay
in the absence of some concrete purpose rooted in a concrete connection to other
people.  In the absence,  that is,  of political purpose and  connection,  it cannot
flourish.  And  it  is  precisely  this  sort  of  failure  of political energy  that
characterizes the humiliation, by Cipolla, of the crowd-and,  to a much greater
degree,  of the narrator as well.'
The  one  person  in  the  whole  story  who  does  try  to  act  politically  in
opposition to Cipolla is the patriotic workingman who is twice  subjugated.  On
the  second  occasion,  he  gives  a  very  minimal  example  of  political  energy,
defying Cipolla:
"That will  do,"  said he  loudly.  "That's  enough jokes  about Torre.
We all come from the place and we won't stand strangers  making fun
of it.  These  two chaps are our friends.  Maybe  they are no scholars,
but even  so  they may  be  straighter  than some  folks in the room who
21.  Id.  at  148-59.
22.  Id.  at  160.
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are so  free with  their boasts about Rome,  though they did not build it
either. "
What defeats him is  that the "we"  he invokes does not emerge to back him up.
The others  do not seem  to share his energy.  They  have been  trained  out of it.
And  political energy  that isn't shared  is,  necessarily,  destined to  frustration.
Now,  there is an intermission  in the show.  On the second take, this is  an
important  part of the  story.  For,  here,  the  narrator  begins  to  focus  on  the
problem.  "You  are sure  to ask,"  he asserts,  "why  we did  not choose  ...to
go."  He  complains  that  Cipolla  "paralysed  our  resolve."  However,  he  is
aware  that answer  will not do.  For this question  is tied  to the question of why
he didn't leave  town earlier.  "[T]he  two questions,"  he sees,  "are  one and  the
same."  And  what is the answer?  "[Y]ou  may call  it inertia,"  he shrugs.  He
is inching toward the truth here.  He now recognizes  that it is not energy,  but
the absence  of energy that is the problem.  But energy  to do what?  To leave?
What  he  still  doesn't  get  is  that what  is  lacking-the  lack  at  the  core  of the
story-is the energy to act,  act politically.  Political energy, of course,  involves
getting  into a struggle.  That he  cannot do.24
As  the  performance  resumes,  he  takes  one  more  step-his  last,  small
step-toward  insight.  Identifying  with  the  crowd  at least  in  its  passivity,  he
states,  "we all cowered"  before Cipolla.  Describing a "well-built, soldierly man
...  unable to lift his arm"  under the hypnotic influence,  he seems to empathize
with  the  "stately"  man.  And  when  Cipolla  humiliates  the  landlord  of  the
pensione where he is staying,  he sympathizes openly:  "Poor  Signor Angiolieri,
so quiet,  so bald!"  Now that Cipolla is picking on more  elevated  members  of
the audience,  the narrator can feel some real connection.  His sympathy, in turn,
spurs his insight.  Signor Angiolieri "did not look,"  he observes,  "as  though he
would  know  how  to  defend  his  happiness,  even  against  powers  much  less"
potent.  Is he  reflecting,  here,  on  his own impotence?  And,  finally,  when the
Italian gentleman  vows, again,  to resist and fails, the narrator  offers a diagnosis
that  echoes  Cipolla's  earlier abstract  pronouncement  and  suggests  that  he  has
learned  something:
If I understand what was going on, it was the negative character of the
young man's fighting position which was his undoing.  It is likely that
not  willing  is  not  a  practicable  state  of  mind;  not to  want  to  do
something  may  be  in  the  long  run  a  mental  content  impossible  to
subsist  on.  Between  not willing  a  certain  thing  and  not  willing  at
23.  Id. at  154-56.
24.  Id. at  164-66.
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all-in other words,  yielding to another  person's will-there may  lie
too small  a space for the idea of freedom  to squeeze into.
He sees now that freedom  requires  some positive purpose,  but he does not-to
the end-recognize  that it requires some  collective engagement  and mobilization
of energy  as well.?
The last  two tableaux of the show teach this unlearned lesson.  The first is
the  "dissolute"  group  set  to  dancing  on  the  stage.  With  the  group  is  the
gentleman  whose  assertion  of  individual  pride,  the  narrator  vainly  supposes,
might have been a  "rallying-point."  It is,  in fact,  Cipolla who is engaging  and
"rallying"  the  people.  What  he  achieves-in  superficial,  debased,  perverse
form-is a collective mobilization of energy.  And what is remarkable is that the
dancers  appear  to be happy.  In  fact,  the noble  gentleman  is  "having  a better
time than  . . . in his hour of pride."  They have  let themselves  go.  What they
have  thrown  off is  not  so  much  "the  burden  of  voluntary  choice,"  as  the
narrator  theorizes.  After  all,  they  may  never  have  experienced  voluntary
choice.  The burden they have been  relieved of-even if artificially  and just for
a moment-is that of day-to-day  isolation and impotence.  Though the nectar is
not real,  they  can  taste in  imagination the freedom  that has been  squeezed  out
of them.
The  final  tableau  places  Mario  beside  Cipolla  on  the  platform.  When
Cipolla summoned him,  "Mario  obeyed."  "[I]t was only too easy,"  the narrator
observes,  "to  see why he obeyed.  After all,  obedience was his calling in life."
When,  early  in  the evening,  Cipolla  had  hypnotized  his  first  subject,  he  had
talked of "divid[ing] up the willing and the doing"  and called it a "[d]ivision of
labour."  Now,  at the end of the evening,  the connection  between  the division
of labor and hypnosis is once  again made  clear.
This connection  is manifest not only in Mario's obedience;  it shows up also
in the narrator's  reflections  on Mario.  He says that he has seen the young man
"nearly  every day."  Yet he says,  "We knew him humanly without knowing him
personally if I may make that distinction."  How so?  He knows what the young
man looks like; he can describe  his "dreamy"  behavior;  he reports  that Mario's
father  is a petty clerk and  that his mother takes in washing.  But,  though he has
observed Mario,  he hasn't engaged him.  Why?  Inadvertently,  he provides  the
answer.  Mario's "white waiter's-coat,"  states the narrator,  "became him better
than  the  . . . suit  he  wore."  He describes  Mario's  hands  as  "slender  and
delicate."  "They  were  hands,"  the narrator  blithers on,  "by  which  one  liked
being  served."  (He is once again echoing one of Cipolla's earlier remarks.)  If
25.  Id.  at  167-71.
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Mario  obeys  because  he  is  a  waiter,  the  narrator  remains  a  passive-a
hypnotized-watcher  of Mario's downfall  for much  the same reason.26
Once  Mario is on the stage, Cipolla  launches an  interrogation.  He begins
with his usual formal courtesy,  congratulating  Mario on his "classic  name"  and
his work  as a  "cup-bearer,  a Ganymede."  "'I like that,'"  he asserts,  "'it is  [a]
classical  allusion.'"  (Thus, he echoes back to the narrator one last time.)  With
the preliminaries over, Cipolla turns from Mario's work life to his personal  life.
"'[H]ave  you  troubles?'"  he  asks.  Mario  promptly  denies  it.  Cipolla,  all
solicitude, continues:  "'You have troubles ...  [Ilt is a girl,  isn't it?  You have
love troubles?'"  After someone in the crowd  supplies the girl's name,  Cipolla
shifts into high gear:
"But  Silvestra,  your  Silvestra-ah,  what  a girl  that  is!  . . . Brings
your heart into your mouth  to  see her walk or laugh  or breathe,  she
is  so  lovely  ....  And  she makes  you  suffer,  this angel,"  went  on
Cippola  ....  "I know what you are thinking:  what does this Cipolla,
with his little physical  defect,  know  about love?  Wrong,  all wrong,
he knows  a lot."
On  the first take,  this is a  glaring invasion of privacy.  But on  double  take,  it
is  more poignant than that.  After all,  it is  the  sole time  in the  story when  an
adult even pretends  to reach out to someone  "personally"  across social barriers.
It represents-again,  in a debased  form-the  possibility of connection.  That  it
is debased-that  Cipolla is making  fun of Mario,  manipulating him,  ultimately
hypnotizing Mario to kiss him as Silvestra-evokes a powerful  sense of absence.
The capacity of the  children to connect  "personally"  to  "the populace"  stands
as  a contrast to  the adult incapacity.  But Cipolla's  mockery  and  manipulation
is not just a contrast-it is the twisting of the knife that makes it impossible not
to see-and,  more, to feel-what  is missing.
Of course,  rebellion has been missing,  too.  Now, Mario rebels.  He shoots
Cipolla.  Why?  And why Mario?  To  be sure,  he has  been humiliated  more
completely-and  he appears to be more  "melancholy"-than the others.  Is that
all there  is to it?  The narrator  makes a point of depicting Mario at the moment
before  he  goes  up on  stage.  He  portrays  the young  man  as  "thickset"  with
"heavy  lidded eyes,"  "thick  lips,"  and a "low  forehead."  "[T]he whole upper
half of his face,"  he observes,  "retreated  behind the lower."  Hardly the image
of a romantic  Individualist hero.  Rather,  it is a primitive image.  Indeed,  the
narrator  notes Mario's  "primitive"  mien.  And,  as  it happens,  his primitivity
draws  important  elements of the  story to  a political  point.  From what  source,
26.  Id.  at  169-73.
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in  the  end,  is  the  energy  required  for  freedom  going  to  come?  From  the
elevated,  refined,  "civilized"  stratum  of  personality  or  society,  that  of  the
narrator?  Or from a more  primitive stratum,  that of Mario?
But is the end of the story  "a liberation"  as the narrator  supposes it to be?
The  individual  who  stood  up  to  Cipolla  has  been  disarmed  and  awaits  the
arriving police.  The crowd  is  in  chaos.  The narrator leaves,  along with his
family.  This is  no liberation.  What's  most striking  is what  does  not happen.
The crowd  doesn't rally around Mario.  The crowd doesn't rebel.  The narrator
doesn't  learn  what  he  needs  to  learn:  that  freedom  requires  political
mobilization of "ordinary people"  and that,  for purposes of politics, you should
embrace  your lot as one "ordinary"  person among many,  taking to heart the fear
and hope  that is the lot of us all."
That  is the second take  on the story.
Pause here  for a moment.  If you have  read Mario and the Magician, ask
yourself which of the takes on  it best matches your own-or best matches your
initial reaction  to  it.  If you haven't  read it,  ask  yourself which  telling of the
story evokes the deepest response, which one resonates  most powerfully for you.
And ask,  then,  which  is most  likely to resonate  powerfully  for the people you
know,  evoking the deepest response  in our contemporary  culture of politics and
law,  in our imagination of constitutionalism.
III.  "HIGHER"  LAW?.
I want  now  to  turn to  the sensibility that animates  and  structures  today's
conventional  discourse  about  constitutional  law.  This  sensibility  (so  I  have
claimed)  is  made  up  of assumptions  about,  images  of,  and  attitudes  toward
ordinary people  as active  and energetic participants,  singly and collectively,  in
politics  and  government.  It  implicates  a  chain  of  reactions  to  the  imagined
reality and possibility of democracy.  What is  "contained"  in reaction  to Mario
and the Magician spreads  through  every  cell  of routine  argument  over  the
meaning  and application of the Constitution.
My approach  here,  more didactic  than before,  will be both diagnostic  and
hortatory.  Identifying  two  very  general  takes  on  ordinary  political
energy-parallelling  the two  already  sketched-I'll  assert  that one is  dominant
in constitutional  law discourse.  I'll  go on  to diagnose and  evaluate the effects
and  bases  of its dominance.  Then,  I'll urge  a  reversal  of attitude.  I'll  urge
consideration  of the other,  subordinated  take on democracy,  pointing to certain
27.  Id. at  173-78.
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ways it  might affect  our  discourse.  I'll suggest that  what are  at stake,  in  the
end,  are conventional  notions not only about the mission of constitutional  law,
but also about its status as "higher"  than ordinary law born of ordinary politics.
Addressing  so  broad  a  topic  in  so  abbreviated  a  compass  means  I'll  be
painting  with  a broad  brush.  Probably  more  precisely,  I'll  be using  a paint
roller-maybe even a spray can.  Let me  stress again:  I am not out to prove or
demonstrate  anything.  What  I  am out  to  do  is  provoke  you,  jar you  to  see
familiar general issues of constitutional law in an unconventional  way, to try out
another take on them.  For that purpose, all I'm offering-all I need  to offer-is
my own take on the conventions of the current  discourse and on an alternative,
one that  is significantly different.
A.  Two  "Takes"  on Ordinary  Political Energy
Put very simply,  the two ways of imagining the political energy of ordinary
people are as  follows:  One imagines  it to be a problem;  the other imagines  its
absence as the problem.  One presumes political peace  to be a good.  The other
worries that peace  is but a mark of popular passivity, presumed  to be bad.  For
one,  the active political involvement of ordinary  people  not only  threatens  the
peace,  but tends to debase  the quality of government  and even risk oppression
as well.  For the other,  it is not only fundamental  to the quality of government,
but also  the most essential  inoculation against oppression.
That,  however,  puts  the  difference  too  simply.  I'll  stretch  out  my
characterization,  elaborating  on  certain  elements and  pointing to  certain  bases
of the -two takes on ordinary  political energy-but with  one important  proviso.
The  proviso  is  that  I  am  referring  neither  to  "reasons"  for,  nor  "empirical
support" for "beliefs"  about the world.  What I am talking about is assumptions,
images,  and attitudes.  Taken  together,  they don't  make  up  a theory:  I'm not
interested here in political,  moral,  or legal theory.  I am interested  in portraying
nothing more-or  less-than a sensibility.
It is a sensibility, as I've said,  that is "about"  what ordinary people are like
when  energized  to  act,  singly  or collectively,  in  politics  and  government.  I
ought  to clarify  that at this  point:  It is  also  about what people  in general are
like  when  moved  by  what  is  "ordinary"  in  them-as  distinct  from  what  is
"higher"  or more  "refined"-to  act politically.  That  is to say,  it is about what
people in  general  are like when  they act  like ordinary people.  At the heart  of
this  sensibility  is  a  distinction  between  different  sorts of  people  as  potential
actors  in  politics-but,  more  fundamentally,  it  is  between  different  sorts  of
attributes.
For the  sake of convenience,  I'll refer  now  to  the two  takes on  ordinary
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political  energy  in  crude  shorthand.  The  first  one  I'll  denominate  the
Anti-Populist  sensibility.  I'll  call  the  second,  by  contrast,  the  Populist
sensibility.  The  purport  of this  shorthand,  beyond  mere  convenience,  will
slowly unfold  as I diagnose and evaluate the two of them.
To the  Anti-Populist sensibility,  ordinary  political energy-and,  hence,  a
politics  animated  by  it-is problematic  because  of attributes  that  set  it  apart
from,  and  identify  it  as  qualitatively  inferior  to,  more  "refined"  sources  of
political participation.  To start with, ordinary  energy is imagined  as springing
from,  as  well  as activating,  states  of mind  and  temperament  presumed  to  be
defective:
emotional
ignorant
fuzzy-minded
simple-minded
These  defective  states  of
irresponsibility:
as opposed to
as opposed to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
mind  are,  in  turn,  associated  with  a  tendency  to
short-sighted
narrow-minded
self-centered
fickle
arbitrary
low standards
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed to
far-sighted
broad-minded
public-spirited
steadfast
principled
high standards
Unfortunately,  they go  relatively unfiltered  and unchecked:
impulsive
peremptory
closed-minded
as opposed to
as  opposed to
as  opposed to
What  is  worse,  these  states  of  mind  tend  to  be  vulnerable  to  influence  and
manipulation:
conformist
suggestible
as opposed  to
as  opposed to
independent
critical
reasonable
informed
clear-headed
complex
deliberate
dialogic
open-minded
1993] 553
Parker: "Here, the People Rule":  A Constitutional Populist Manifesto
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993554  VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  27
And, what is even worse, this vulnerability to influence and manipulation  is fed
by  a volatile insecurity:
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
composed
magnanimous
placable
When  political  energy activates
tends,  then,  to be defective:
attributes  so  defective,  the  resultant behavior
as opposed to
as opposed to
as  opposed to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as  opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
as opposed  to
cool
considerate
civilized
prudent
sober
restrained
respectful
tolerant
fair
cosmopolitan
statesmanlike
Ordinary political energy  is imagined  to be problematic in two related  respects:
It makes  for a politics that is not just low  in quality,  but dangerous  as well.
Its  low  quality  and  dangerousness  are  most  dramatically  (and
conventionally)  imagined in the collective behavior of ordinary  people acting as
"crowds."  Think of the crowd on the beach in Thomas Mann's story-agitated,
moralistic, tribal-bullying the narrator and his family.  Or think of the herd-like
crowd "led"  by Cipolla, applauding his mixture of abuse and patriotic sentiment.
Bullied itself,  it cheers  the bully.  Yet the  defects of ordinary  political  energy
are not imagined as being limited to such collective behavior.  On  the contrary,
they are seen as tending also to infect the action of individuals,  particularly those
responding  to  or  currying  favor  from  groups  of people.  Think  of the  town
official  who  extracts  "ransom"  from Mann's  narrator,2  or  think  of Cipolla
himself.  Even individuals exercising power independently-exposed  to no direct
group influence-are  hardly immune  to  the virus.  Think of the agitated client
of the Grand Hotel,  fearing  "acoustic"  infection by a child's cough,  who insists
that  the  narrator  and  his  family  move  out  of their  room.29  Or  think  of the
official of the hotel  who complies,  arbitrarily  favoring  certain  clients,  for  the
28.  Mario, supra note  2,  at  142.
29.  Id. at  136.
anxious
resentful
angry
hot
rude
vulgar
reckless
intoxicated
invasive
abusive
moralistic
prejudiced
tribal
mob-like
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second  time, over others.
In a world imagined as charged with ordinary political  energy of this sort,
the Anti-Populist response  is  to pursue  one of two  main courses.  The  first is
withdrawal:  celebration  and cultivation of privacy  and of peace,  seeking  space
insulated from  infection by politics.  The narrator of Mario and the Magician
chooses  this  course.  The  second  is  transcendence:  insulation  of  a  more
"refined,"  higher-minded mode of political participation  in an exalted  realm,  a
realm from which,  then,  to try  to contain or to retard,  to tame or to manipulate,
the forces  of ordinary politics.  What unites the two is not just worry about the
danger of such  politics,  but also insistence  on  eschewing  intimate  involvement
in  it.  Behind  the  insistence  on insulation  is  fear,  to  be  sure,  but  (at  least a
genteel)  loathing  as well.  At the  wellspring of the Anti-Populist  sensibility is
disdain-a "looking down"  on the political energy of ordinary people as well as
on the "lower"  elements of oneself drawn out by energetic political exertion and
engagement  on a level  with ordinary people.
What,  now,  is  the Populist sensibility  like?  It might bathe,  I  suppose,  in
the  "romance  of  the  ordinary,"  flipping  upside-down  the  Anti-Populist
identification  of who is refined and who  is vulgar.  That is,  it  might involve a
notion that it is ordinary people  who tend to be reasonable, public-spirited,  and
respectful-and  elites that tend to be emotional,  self-centered,  abusive,  and  so
on down  the list of contrasting  positive and negative  qualities.  No doubt,  such
a romantic populism has had (and still has)  some currency  in American  culture.
(Think of the famous Frank  Capra movies.)  But there are three problems  with
it.  First,  it just  is not very plausible-especially  at this moment in history-to
take  so  highfalutin  a  view  of the  ordinary,  the  baseline,  in  human  nature.3°
Second,  to do so isn't even  interesting.  For, third,  the fundamental  issue posed
by the  Anti-Populist sensibility has to do with the idea that some people  are  fit
for active participation in political  life and  that some are not.  It has  to do,  that
is, with the hierarchy  of qualities  by which  one is distinguished from the other.
So,  as  a deep  contrast  to the Anti-Populist sensibility, what we  need is  a very
different take on that  hierarchy of qualities.
This might involve, once again, a flipping upside-down of the Anti-Populist
sensibility.  The  qualities  Anti-Populism  imagines  to  be  inferior  might  be
envisioned as superior.  And vice versa.  Thus emotion might be celebrated  as
superior  to  reason.  And  so  on.  Once  again,  this  sort  of  counter-culture
populism  has  had  and  has  some  currency.  But  it  runs  up  against  a  similar
30.  Indeed,  "socialist  realism"  [sic]  nowadays inspires not simply  incredulity,  but widespread
nausea and alarm as well.  To be  sure,  romanticization of an elite or "vanguard,"  which sometimes
accompanies, as well as contradicts,  a "romance of the ordinary,"  is  (I'll claim) more nauseating and
alarming.
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problem  of plausibility,  and  it  similarly  evades  the  basic  issue  presented  by
Anti-Populism:  the  particular  way  it bisects  general  qualities  as  suited  or
unsuited  to  political  participation.  For  a  deep  contrast  to  the  Anti-Populist
sensibility,  we  need  a  take  on  political  energy  that  is  oriented  in  terms  of
different coordinates.
At the heart of the Populist sensibility is a refusal to look at political energy
in  terms  of superior  and  inferior qualities  imagined  along these  Anti-Populist
lines.  In  the  place  of  those  coordinates,  it  substitutes  two  others  that  are
intimately related  to one another.  Taken  together,  they produce  a real  shift, a
reorientation  of sensibility.
On one axis, the Populist sensibility measures how much ordinary political
energy  is being expressed-bow widespread  is its expression,  to what extent are
individuals  engaging one another  politically-assuming that expression  of such
energy  is  better than passivity or  insulation.  This  means  energetic  activity  in
politics by ordinary  people, and  it means engagement  with ordinary people,  on
a common  level.  This sort of activity is imagined  as superior not because it is
somehow  elevated  or refined,  but  for  simpler  reasons.  It  makes  for  better
government-responsive  to  ordinary  people  whom  it  purports  to  serve,  its
purported  sovereign.  What  is  more,  it's  a  tonic.  That  is,  it is  good  for  the
vitality of all who take part in it,  collectively as well as  singly.
Passivity and/or  insulation,  by contrast,  are  imagined  as unhealthy  in the
case  both  of individuals  (think  of Mann's  narrator)  and  of groups  (Cipolla's
audience).  The assumption  is  that  such  self-confinement  is  nurtured  by,  and
nurtures,  states of mind  and  temperament  that are defective:
meek  as opposed to  courageous
paralyzed  as opposed to  vigorous
role-bound  as opposed to  spontaneous
isolated  as opposed to  connected
These attributes are imagined as based in-and enforced by-repression,  whether
psychological repression of ordinary,  self-assertive instincts or social repression
of vitality by role-expectations,  mandated  explicitly or implicitly:
inhibited  as opposed to  expansive
other-directed  as opposed to  inner-directed
diffident  as opposed  to  self-confident
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These kinds of repression  are imagined,  in turn,  as inviting as well as fostering
another kind of repression,  a political repression of the weak  by  the strong:
submissive  as opposed  to  vigilant
conformist  as opposed to  independent
suggestible  as opposed to  critical
Thus, political passivity and/or insulation don't just erode political liberty-they
actually pose a threat to  it.
Of course,  inhibition is  a  sort of refinement.  Release  of inhibition  may
well involve release of "ordinary"  emotions such as anger or self-righteousness,
which are crude and even aggressive.  To a Populist sensibility,  such emotions
aren't the whole sum and substance of ordinary energy.  But,  to the extent they
are part  and parcel  of an  expression  of ordinary  political  energy,  they  do  not
render  it worthy of disdain.
It is exactly such  disdain that is measured on the second axis of the Populist
sensibility.  Disdain for the political energy of ordinary people-and for the sorts
of "ordinary"  attributes  supposedly  brought  out by  political  engagement  with
them-is  envisioned  as  deeply  problematic.  It  is  a  defective  attitude  since  it
involves  cutting  oneself  off  from  possibilities  of  political  assertion  and
engagement  and  fosters  passive  withdrawal.  What  is  worse,  it  can-if
disseminated widely and solidified  in institutions affecting everyday  life-erode
self-confidence  among ordinary people and metastasize political passivity.  And,
worse yet,  it may embolden elites to claim transcendence,  securing  an elevated
position from which to try  to contain,  control, or manipulate ordinary  political
energy.  Think of Cipolla,  with his toxic superiority  complex,  manipulating  his
audience.  Think, too, of the narrator-Cipolla's prim double-whose disdainful
insulation takes shape as pathetic passivity, but who senses an affinity to and for
the active,  transcendent  power of the "magician."
What  is striking here  is the  relation of the two takes on  ordinary political
energy.  To  a  Populist  sensibility,  the  nemesis  is  represented  by  the  Anti-
Populist  sensibility.  And  vice versa.  The  two aren't just distinct;  they  aren't
just opposites;  they are at each other's throats.  Both of them resonate for most
of us,  I  believe.  Yet they struggle for  predominance  in our minds and  in our
hearts.
B.  The Predominance of Anti-Populism
In  the  minds  and  hearts  of  most  American  constitutional  lawyers,  an
Anti-Populist  sensibility  appears  to  predominate  now.  Is  this  statement
surprising?  If it is, how can I back it up?  If it isn't, no backup  may be needed.
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But to  the extent  that  the predominance  of the Anti-Populist  take  on ordinary
political energy is dismissed as obvious,  its effects on  the conventional discourse
of constitutional  law may  well pass without notice.  What,  then,  are  they?
The  effects,  I  believe,  involve  an  inflation  of  constitutional  law,  its
grandiose  puffing  as  law  imagined  to  be  "higher"-because "better"-than
ordinary  law  made  by ordinary  people.  Like  one who  ingests  sour  milk and
who,  as a consequence,  inflates, we  constitutional lawyers have  fed on disdain
for  the political energy  of ordinary  people.  So,  we  have  bloated not just our
image of ourselves,  but also of the law we aspire  to serve,  making it,  in cultural
effect,  a vast bubble of heated  gas  floating above ordinary  experience-or  what
is  worse,  a  weight,  politically  condescending  and  repressive,  frequently
humiliating, even  suffocating.
31
To  back  up-if not  support  or,  still  less,  establish-the  diagnosis,  I'll
illustrate  it a  little bit.  I'll pick  and sketch  quickly  a few  illustrations  from a
fund  of  material  that  serves  my  purpose  for  two  reasons.  It  is  a  fund  of
symptoms of the sensibility predominant  in discourse about constitutional  law.
And it  is  immediately  accessible,  without research,  to  constitutional  lawyers,
who  can  check  what  I  have  to  say,  thinking  of other,  perhaps  inconsistent,
illustrations.  The  fund  I'll  draw  upon  is  the  fund  of banal  statements,  or
cliches,  at  the  tips  of  the  tongues  of  all  of us  who  know  how  to  practice
constitutional  argument.  Should  it seem  too  low-life  to  mention  nothing  but
cliches of everyday  argument,  I'll offer also,  for good measure,  an illustration
or  two  from  the  world  of high  society-the  world,  that  is,  of  constitutional
theory as practiced  in law schools.32
Let's start with a master clich6:  the notion that majoritarianism  or majority
rule is the background,  the norm against which constitutional law proceeds.  We
talk  of deferring  to  the  majority  as  presumptively  necessary.  The  counter-
31.  Let  me  note here  two  important  qualifications.  First,  as  I  said  at  the  beginning  of this
lecture,  what  I  am  talking  about  is  the  cultural  effect  of  the  "conventional  discourse"  of
constitutional  law.  It  is the discourse-not the  outcomes of cases-that I'm suggesting is bubblelike
or repressive.  Second,  in the book I'm now writing (see supra note  1),  I'll address the question how
a  discourse  that  is  bubblelike  and  repressive  can,  nonetheless,  engage  us,  "move"  us.  I won't
address that question here.
32.  By  way of introduction,  I'll  mention two  illustrations-they're no more than anecdotal,  to
be sure-drawn  from  my own experience  in academic high society.  For nearly ten years,  I asked
my  students to  read Mario  and the Magician  for my last  class on constitutional  law.  I found that,
for  most of them,  the first (Anti-Populist)  take on the  story had clear  and  consistent priority.  And
that was  after they had listened  to me  for a  semester!  Then, just  last  summer,  I asked a  group of
my  faculty colleagues to  read  it.  They,  or the few  who actually  completed the  assignment,  read it
in just the  same  way.  In  fact,  they (unlike  my students)  seemed  to have great trouble  seeing any
other way to read  it.
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majoritarian  character  of judicial  review  thus  is  described  as  a  "difficulty."
Doesn't  this  majoritarian  rhetoric  undercut  my diagnosis?  Doesn't it  suggest
that the predominant sensibility of our discourse is really Populist?  That  it is a
celebration  of ordinary  political energy?  In a word:  No,  it doesn't.
When we say we "defer"  to "the  majority,"  we tend in so doing to express
an attitude toward  the majority.  Attitudes typically expressed  are of three kinds,
and all of them are relatively disdainful of ordinary political energy.  Deference
is sometimes presented,  first of all,  as a sort of refined withdrawal.  Getting out
of the way of a big,  vulgar group,  declining to engage with it:  the "deference"
conveyed  is haughty  and  ironic,  perhaps  respectful  of brute  force,  or strictly
formal  authority,  but that's all.  (Think of Mann's narrator.)  In this  vein,  we
hold  our  noses  and  claim  we  are  deferring  to  the  (implicitly  irrational)
"preferences"  of the majority.  At other times,  we take what would seem  to be
the opposite tack.  We  claim we  are deferring  to the "wisdom"  or "judgment"
or "experience"  of the majority.  Here,  the irony is thicker,  heavier.  (Think of
the  "derogatory  courtesy"  of  Cipolla.)  We  use  these  terms  in  pro  forma
fashion.  What is more,  we use such flattery  simply to justify deference-to  say
we don't care  to look behind  it,  to inquire  whether it's deserved.  This sort  of
formal,  explicitly empty  flattery  is-at  least  in part-an  expression  of courtly
disdain.
Even more scornful,  finally, is the routine assertion  that the majority  does
"rule."  The  actual  truth  of  this  description  is  rarely  questioned  in  the
conventional  discourse.  Rarely  is  it noticed  as  open to  question.33  Yet  even
as  we repeat  the assertion,  we know that  the  majority of citizens  usually  does
not vote;  we know  something about special  interest  groups,  lobbyists,  and  the
rest.  Granted,  a  silent  majority  may  be  silent because  it is  satisfied.  And,
granted,  the  chance  that  the  silence  might  end  one  day  may  exert  indirect
influence.  But the  fact remains  that  routine talk of rule not just by a majority
of legislators,  but  by  "the  majority"-as  if it were  a fact-is  striking.  What
should  we  make  of  a  man  who  keeps  repeating  that  because  women  are  a
majority,  therefore  they "rule"  (at least indirectly)?  (Think of Cipolla  insisting
he is the  servant  of the crowd.)  What  attitude, if not disdain,  is conveyed  by
this routine?
If  ironic  praise  of  "majority  rule"  is  the  background  noise  of  typical
constitutional  discourse,  in the  foreground  is  a very  different  theme:  explicit
and elaborate criticism-criticism  not just of the "system"  of majority rule, but
also of the majority itself, of ordinary  people who are in the majority.  Indeed,
the animating mission of modern  constitutional  law is conventionally  described
33.  The voting rights and  reapportionment doctrines are the exceptions that illuminate  the rule.
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as  the correction of failures allegedly endemic  to majority rule.  The mission is
to  safeguard  "The  Individual"  or  "minorities"  or  even  some  governmental
bodies  (the  states,  the  executive,  the judiciary,  the  legislature)  supposedly
threatened by the force of ordinary  political energy.  The threat  is portrayed  as
due  in part-but only  a  secondary  part-to  defects  in  the  institutions through
which  that  force  is  employed.  More  basically,  the  threat  is  envisioned  as
coming from the base and dangerous quality of the political energy driving alike
the majority and  the ordinary  people who hold official power in its name.
Thus,  by  rote, we  construct  our  "activist"  constitutional arguments  with
derogatory depictions, whether explicit or implicit, of ordinary political energy.
We  talk of prejudice or self-aggrandizement,  oppressiveness  or impulsiveness,
short-sightedness or simple-mindedness,  as innate propensities.  In  the modern
era as in the Lochner era,  we pick these descriptions of ordinary political  actors
from the Anti-Populist candy box,  satisfying  the sweet tooth  that we,  as  legal
actors,  take  for granted.  And  so,  filling up  on insults,  we  become  more  and
more  full of ourselves.34
The pervasive Anti-Populist sensibility is also expressed  in the scope of the
rights  that  typically  are  set  up  against  the  depredation  of  ordinary  political
energy.  For, even  as this sensibility calls rights forth,  it obstructs their growth.
If there  is one almost  unchallenged clich6 in  our talk about  rights nowadays,  it
is that, whatever  a constitutional right may be,  it may not be  "absolute."  How
come?  The assumption is that an absolute right would be "abused."  And why?
It would  be abused,  we assume,  because  the exercise  of rights is  animated  by
the same  sort of ordinary  political energy-with all  its defects-that  the rights
are meant to protect against  in the first place.  Thus to check and moderate,  and
so to "improve,"  the exercise both of rights and government,  we  must, we say,
keep both in gently held leading strings of a "reasonable"-theefore  "higher"-
constitutional law.
When  we justify the authority of judges to pursue the imagined  mission of
constitutional  law-and,  in  the  process,  to  overturn  decisions  by  political
actors-we  talk  in  terms  of  the  supposedly  superior quality  of  judicial
decisionmaking.  And,  again,  those terms  typically are  drawn  from  the Anti-
Populist lexicon.  Whether because of training or acculturation,  tenure in office
or a shaping of issues by the judicial process, judges, we say,  are insulated  from
the pressures  of ordinary  politics.  They  can  transcend  ordinary  politics.  By
dint of their quality of mind and temperament,  they can oppose it diametrically.
When  political  actors  are  emotional,  they  can  be  reasonable;  when  political
34.  The  Lochner  Court's  anguished  cry-"[A]re  we  all  . . . at  the  mercy  of  legislative
majorities? "-could be our  cry  as  liberal  or conservative  legal  "activists"  nowadays.  Lochner v.
New  York,  198 U.S.  45,  59  (1905).
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actors are self-regarding,  they can be public-spirited.  They can speak the "sober
second thought."  They  can represent  our  "better"  selves.  Because judges  can
be  so  very  superior  to  political  actors,  they  are  well  suited,  we  profess,  to
contain  or  tame  the  lowly,  threatening  tendency  of ordinary  political energy
through interpretation  and application of the Constitution.
Yet  lurking  even  within judges  we  see  the stirring  of  ordinary  political
energy.  We  worry  that  it  may  distort their  "reading"  of congtitutional  law.
Thus  we  fuss  over  the  extent  to  which  their  work  is  infected  by  "personal
values"  or  "political  commitments."  And we insist that  they be insulated  not
only  from  ordinary  politics,  but from  these baser  aspects  of  themselves,  that
they  transcend  and  contain  or  tame  them.  We  differ  among ourselves  as  to
how-and  to  what  degree-this  sort  of insulation  and  transcendence  may  be
accomplished.35  In the last few decades,  our differences  have led us to become
more  conscious  and  much  more  demanding  of  abstract  "methodologies"  of
reasoning on constitutional  topics.  As  a result,  the general  standards  to which
we hold this "reasoning"  have undergone swift and steady inflation.
The inflation of standards has,  in turn,  led to a displacement of status in the
conventional  discourse of constitutional  law.  On  one hand,  it has eroded  the
capacity  of  ordinary  people  to  take  part  in-and  even  understand-such
argument.  Citizens,  including political actors  charged  with a  responsibility to
consider constitutional  law,  become  its  spectators,  fascinated  mainly  by  their
distance from it.  Even judges, ordinary  people wearing  robes, find it more and
more difficult to draft opinions that go out in their names.  On the other hand,
the escalation  of standards  has  amplified  the  voice  of legal  academia.  Law
clerks,  recent  graduates at the top of their class at top law schools,  draft more
and more judicial opinions.  Judges employ more and more  clerks.  Professors
criticize  the opinions.  New students  learn  to  write  "better"  opinions  than the
ones drafted by their predecessors.  The conventional discourse of constitutional
law breathes  in  the warm air of the academy,  rises over the heads  of many  to
whom  it  is  supposedly  addressed,  and  then  sends  down  a  subtle  message  of
inadequacy  to everyone who is not "in  the know."36
Since the  1980s,  the special contribution of academia  to constitutional  law
has involved something called  "constitutional theory."  A potentially interesting
35.  See, e.g.,  Adamsonv.  California,  332 U.S.  46,  59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring),  68 (Black,
J.,  dissenting)  (1947).  Differences  on this  point  have preoccupied much  contemporary  argument
over the subject.  Compare ROBERT BORK,  THE TEMPTING OF  AMERICA (1990)  with JOHN H.  ELY,
DEMOCRACY  &  DISTRUST:  A THEORY  OF JUDICIAL REviEw  (1980).
36.  This account of  the amplification of the academic voice in constitutional law is itself a clich6
now.  Perhaps it is exaggerated,  but it is  "on to"  a  vital trend.  The next  step  in this amplification
would involve an added acceleration of the tendency to appoint professors to  the judiciary.
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venture,  constitutional  theory  promised  to  merge  the  inflated  talk  about
"methodologies"  of "reasoning"  into more open-textured,  openly controversial
talk  about  competing  visions  of the  good  political  life  that  somehow  might
inform  constitutional  argument.37  To  date,  this  theory  has  not  had  much
impact on  the practice  of the  law.  In  fact,  it has  been  mainly  confined  to  a
small lapful of professors.  Its career is instructive,  however, for the way it has
bent to the manifest  magnetism of the Anti-Populist sensibility.
At the core  of recent  constitutional  theory is  the idea  of "community." 38
In particular,  we have  talked  of a  "republican"-as  opposed  to a  "liberal"-
vision  of our  political  life.  The  focus  has  been  on  the  importance  of  the
"common interest" and of "civic virtue,"  understood as commitment to seeking
the "common interest" through political engagement.  In the  1970s, when I first
organized  my  own  constitutional  law  class  in  these  terms,  I  treated  the
competing visions simply as  images,  rhetorical  motifs informing  and  enabling
conflict within the law.  And I viewed  the republican  vision itself as conflicted:
One  might  imagine  "civic  virtue"  in  terms  of energetic,  uninhibited  political
participation  by  anyone and  everyone,  seeing the  inclusiveness  and energy  of
politics as the best guarantor of the common  good.  (That is to  say,  a Populist
spin  on  the  "republican"  vision.)  Or,  on the other  hand,  one  might imagine
"civic  virtue"  in terms of "reason,"  a process of wise "deliberation"  over the
.common  interest,"  transcending  the defects of ordinary  politics.  (That is,  an
Anti-Populist spin.)  I understood this conflict internal  to the republican  vision
to  open  in  the  law  more  room  for  the  clash  of  ideas.  However,  the
constitutional  theory  of  the  last  decade  has  developed  in  a  very  different
direction.  It  has  revolved  about  the  Anti-Populist  version  of  republican
community,  scorning, wiping out,  the Populist version.39  In lofty new stagings
of old salutes to "reasoned  deliberation"-honoring  it again as being better and
so "higher"  than ordinary political energy-it has costumed conventional disdain
for  ordinary  energy  in  a  powdered  wig.  In  fact,  the  disdain  has  been  so
powerful as  to  push a  lot of constitutional  theory  to transform  the  republican
vision  into  "republicanism"-a  principle  or  doctrine,  supposedly  based
authoritatively  in the world of the  framers,  that  should be  "applied"  to decide
constitutional cases.  Thus it has responded  to the old urge to cook up  another
methodology  of  decisionmaking,  claiming  again  to  transcend  all  that  is
"ordinary"  in  decisionmakers,  again  to  close  down  rather  than  open  up
37.  In  1981,  I called  for just such an enterprise,  although I didn't foresee the course it would
take.  See  Parker, Past of Constitutional Theory, supra note  1.
38.  For a brief and interesting review of the last decade's "constitutional  theory,"  see PAUL W.
KAHN,  LEGITIMACY  AND  HISTORY  171-209 (1992).
39.  Of course,  there  have been some  exceptions.  See,  e.g.,  James  Gray  Pope,  Republican
Moments:  The Role of the Direct  Popular  Power in the American Constitutional  Order, 139 U. PA.
L.  REV.  287 (1990).
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ideological dispute.  At the end of a decade,  what this pompous theory has done
is simply  incubate a further  inflation of the discourse.'
In truth,  the high rate of inflation of the discourse-driven  by disdain for
ordinary political energy-is not confined  to the law schools or the courtrooms.
It tends  to show  itself wherever  and  whenever  we talk  about the  Constitution.
The pomposity,  the grandiosity,  the pretense  of "higher"  law:  all are taken  for
granted.  We  appear  not  fully  to  grasp  how  this  inflated  discourse  deflates
ordinary people as political  actors.  That,  too,  we take for granted.
Let  me  give  a  couple  examples.  Think,  first,  of any  discussion  you've
heard about  proposals  to  call a new  constitutional  convention.  Think  of how
skepticism about it is expressed.  Wouldn't a convention be filled with ordinary
politicians?  How  could  one  of them  possibly  sit where  James  Madison  sat?
Isn't  it  probable  such  a  convention  would  "get  out of  hand"?  Wouldn't  it
respond to popular opinion,  cater to immediate desires,  make a big mess?  Isn't
it  frightening  that  ordinary  people  say  they  don't  "believe  in"  The  Bill  of
Rights?  Could we let  them meddle  with The Constitution?
Or consider  this  anecdote.  For  a  few  days,  over  New  Year's  Eve,  an
invited  group  of  fancy  professionals-"influential,  well-connected,  very
successful people,"  we  are told-get together at a resort  in  South Carolina  for
a  "Renaissance  Weekend"  to talk  with one  another.  The Weekend  is  famous
because  the  President  has  long  been  a  participant.  At  the  last  annual
convocation,  one  participant-Dean  of a  Divinity  School  and  described  as  a
"believer  in Renaissance"-mentioned  the original constitutional  convention  in
order  to shed  light on  what he and his friends  are up  to:
"I  think  the  fundamental  vision  of democracy  is  that  politics  is  a
matter  of rational  persuasion,"  said  Ronald  Thiemann,  dean  of the
Harvard Divinity School.  "That was clearly the view  of the best [get
that?] of the Federalists.  They also  understood,  of course,  that force
was sometimes necessary,  but they knew that any force had to rest on
a  base  of  rational  discussion,  the  sort  of  thing  that  is  cultured  in
settings like  this one.""
Think about it.
40.  The  same  goes  for  another  strain  of theory  that  also  focuses  on  the  quality  of public
"dialogue"  but  doesn't  talk  about  republicanism.  For  a  brief,  interesting  sketch,  see  MARK
TUSHNET,  RED,  WHITE,  AND  BLUE  149-58  (1988).
41.  Michael Kelly,  The New Year at a New Age Retreat:  The  Clintons in Agreeable Company,
N.Y.  TIMES,  Dec.  31,  1992,  at  A21.
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C.  Why Do a  "Double Take"?
All right,  you say,  it's obvious enough that the Anti-Populist sensibility is
predominant  in contemporary constitutional  law.  Quite probably its effect is to
inflate conventional  discourse about the law.  And maybe it produces discourse
that  is  rather  insensitive,  even  condescending,  to  our  ordinary  experience-
maybe even repressive of ordinary energy.  But so what?  What's really wrong
with that?  Isn't that what constitutional law has always been  like?  Isn't it what
the framers  meant  it to  be like?  Why even  try  to think about  what difference
an enhanced  Populist sensibility might  make  in  the  discourse of constitutional
law?  Why even  begin to  question  the image of constitutional law as  "higher"
law?  Why try to  "do a double take"  on ordinary political  energy?
I'll answer  these questions  by sketching three arguments.  In  a way,  they
are  three  counterarguments.  For they  take hold  of, and  then  attempt to  turn
upside  down,  what  I  think  are  three  principal'  sources  of the  conventional
unwillingness to imagine ordinary political energy-and so constitutional law-in
a different pattern.  Each  of these sources  is located  in the realm of sensibility.
Hence,  once again,  I'll draw  on our common  fund of cliches  to illustrate what
I have  to say  about this resistance  to re-imagination.
The  first  of  these  sources  of resistance  is  a  chronic  fetishism  of  the
Constitution,  constitutional  law,  and  the  Supreme  Court.  Such  fetishism-
extravagant if not obsessive  reverence  for the icons,  liturgies,  and orthodoxies
of Our Constitutionalism  to which quasi-supernatural  powers,  beyond ordinary
human  agency,  are  commonly  attributed-has  waxed  and  waned  over  the
decades.  But  over  the  last  several  decades,  in  the  face  of  a  variety  of
fundamental  challenges,  it has  proved  remarkably  persistent  and  surprisingly
potent.
To an extent,  of course, this fetishism is just a symptom of the predominant
Anti-Populist  sensibility,  just  one  more  aspect  of  the  inflation  it  sparks  in
discourse  about the  Constitution.  At the same  time, however,  it  has a special
feedback  effect.  For,  once established,  it works  to "lock  in"  the Anti-Populist
imagination of ordinary politics and of "higher" law that gave it birth in the first
place.
Contemporary  constitutional fetishism takes two primary  forms.  The first
involves  an  imagination  of the  Constitution  not as  amenable  to  a  variety  of
interpretations-each  plausible according  to its own assumptions-but as  having
one "correct"  meaning,  founded  in a body of "correct"  assumptions.  Portrayed
as having one meaning,  it can  then be portrayed as having a determinate life of
its own-an object inspiring obedience or  maybe  even  faith.  When  evoked to
sanctify the predominant sensibility, this image enhances  its appeal.  Invoked to
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resist  efforts  to  contest-or  claim  the  contestibility  of-the  predominant
sensibility,  it  entrenches  this  sensibility.  In this  vein,  we  pontificate  that  the
framers or long tradition-or whatever-planted  Anti-Populist assumptions "in"
constitutional  law which now,  on  its own,  mandates  these assumptions.  More
generally  and  subliminally,  this  fetishism  helps  "lock  in"  the  Anti-Populist
sensibility  by  suggesting  that  constitutional  law  is  "higher"  not  simply  in  a
qualitative,  but in an  idolatrous,  sense of the word.42
The  other  conspicuous  sort  of  contemporary  constitutional  fetishism  is
precisely attuned to enhance the assumed qualitative superiority of constitutional
law.  What  it involves  is imagination of our Constitution  not simply  as terribly
valuable, but terribly vital and vulnerable as well-so vital and so vulnerable that
any  meddling  with  it,  any  infection  of it  by  ordinary  politics,  could  lead  to
absolute disaster.  Thus we talk of one or another  "delicate"  balance embodied
in it.  We  depict  it as  "fragile"-intending  that as ultimate praise.  Testifying
against  a proposed  amendment  requiring  a balanced  federal  budget,  an expert
said it would  "cheapen"  what he named  "the  most precious legacy we  have  to
leave  to our children,  the Constitution."  He warned,  it was reported,  that "the
disrespect  that now goes  to politicians"  might well  "spread  to the Constitution
itself."43   Along  the  same  lines,  we  describe  political situations-particularly
those involving the extension or abuse of executive power-in hyperbolic terms
as  "constitutional  crises."  Iran-Contra  or  Watergate  or  the Pentagon  Papers:
each  of them  supposedly  shows  how  vital and  vulnerable is  our  Constitution,
how thin the membrane of law,  how threatening to it the coarse energy released
by  ordinary  politics.'  The  support  such  sentiment  gives  the  predominant
Anti-Populist sensibility is obvious.
These  two  sorts of fetishism-voiced with differing intensity,  as well as in
differing proportions, by conservatives  and liberals-are now taken for granted.
If for a moment we stop and think about them,  however,  they may  deflate with
a pop.  For we all,  liberals and conservatives,  have  clearly  in the backs of our
minds  lessons  taught by  the  legal  realists.  We  recall  the  realist  critique  of
42.  1  have heard countless lawyers, as well as non-lawyers, insist that someone with whom they
disagree about a question of constitutional law does not "believe  in"  the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights or the  First Amendment.  The  fetishism  expressed there  is  startling  if  you stop  and  think
about it.  For an example of a scholar invoking this sort of fetishism,  see Owen M.  Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation,  34 STAN.  L. REV.  739,  763  (1985).
43.  Adam Clymer, Starring Role In  Budget Act:  Fear of Voters,  N.Y. TIMES,  June 5,  1992,
at  A9.  Ask yourself:  Is  the Constitution really  "the  most precious legacy"  we  can  leave to  our
children?  The familiarity of this  sentiment may,  at first,  keep us from  appreciating how  fetishistic
it is.
44.  For a comment on "constitutional  crisis"  rhetoric,  see,  e.g.,  Paul Berman,  The  Vanities  of
Patriotism,  THE NEW  REPUBLIC,  July 1, 1991,  at  29.
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egregious  constitutional  fetishism  in  the  Lochner  era. 5  We  even  cite  that
critique  against  one  another.  When  we  indulge our  own,  no-less-egregious
fetishism,  we do it in manifest bad faith.  Appreciating  that, we should reject it.
In  rejecting  it,  we  start  to  unravel  the  costume  of  the  Anti-Populist
outlook-freeing ourselves of this least deeply-rooted of the sources of resistance
to re-imagination  of Anti-Populist assumptions.
The second source of resistance  goes a lot deeper.  It is not just a symptom
specific  to  constitutional  discourse.  Rather,  it  is  rooted  in  the political  and
social  context of that discourse.  So,  it cannot be deflated simply by pointing to
contradictions within conventional talk about constitutional  law.  Yet-because
it involves  aspects of a usually taken-for-granted  sensibility-appreciation of its
implications  may help free us from the blinders it imposes.
The disdain for ordinary political energy at work in constitutional law is not
at all peculiar to it.  To the contrary,  this disdain is embedded  in the sensibility
of "the  well-educated  class."  Members of this class fancy that they are properly
"the  governing  class"-that  it  is people  like  them who  should  hold  important
positions in government.  Yet government tends  to involve,  even depend upon,
politics.  That,  in  turn, makes  "the well-educated  class"  anxious.  For there  is
no  denying  that  politics is  going  to  involve-and  may  involve  close  contact
with-other sorts of people.  In politics, ordinary people may even get the upper
hand.  This specter tends to evoke,  in one  shape or another,  the sort of disdain
for ordinary political energy that finds a voice,  an  especially eloquent voice,  in
constitutional discourse.6
This  is  a  very  old  story,  to  be  sure.  The  tendency  of a  self-imagined
"governing  class"  to  fear  and  to  loathe  the  rise  of  political  challengers  is
familiar.  Often,  challenged  social  and economic  elites have  infused  their own
disdainful  sensibility  into  the  law.  What  is  somewhat  newer  is  the  special
insecurity of today's elite.  Identifying the top dogs of his own period, Professor
Felix Frankfurter  "had  time and patience only  for the brilliant and the boys of
old  and  wealthy  families.""  Nowadays,  who  knows  which  are  "old  and
wealthy families"?  Who cares?  The very phrase has lost its resonance.  Today,
"the  brilliant"  are  on  top.  But it's hard  to  tell who's "brilliant."  Although  a
family name  or a fortune can be passed  down from parent  to child,  the quality
of  brilliance  cannot.  Educational  credentials  are  a  poor-but  the
45.  For a very famous example, see Thomas Reed Powell,  Constitutional Metaphors, THE NEW
REPUBLIC,  Feb.  11,  1925,  at 314.
46.  For a  wonderful  sketch  of a  vital  moment  in  the modem  formation  of this  attitude-the
Scopes trial-see GARRY  WILLS,  UNDER  GOD  108-14 (1990).
47.  Joseph P.  Lash,  A  Brahmin of  the Law:  A Biographical Essay,  in FROM  THE  DIARIES OF
FELIX FRANKFURTER  3,  35  (Joseph P. Last  ed.,  1975).
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only-replacement  for a name and wealth in a society where merit appears to be
key,  but offers  little  security.  In these  circumstances,  the well-educated  are
motivated  to  inflate  their  self-image  as  "the  governing  class"  and,  also,  to
spread scorn for the political energy of the "uneducated"-the  middlebrows and
lowbrows,  the ordinary,  the majority.
The scorn that gets spread finds expression in cliches that dramatize,  then,
this  powerful  strain  in  our  political  sensibility.  Consider  common
characterizations  of politics we all have at the tips of our tongues.  We portray
it as  a business of "dirty,"  "petty"  "pandering"  to  ignorant voters and  selfish
interests.  But,  at  the  same  time,  we  say  it  can  be  a  "noble  profession.
"48
What is it that makes  the difference?  The answer is:  leadership.  The "noble"
leader,  we imagine,  must have  "the common touch,"  but not be common.  He
must  have  "courage,"  which  we  tend  to  imagine  as  strength  to  stand  for
"principle,"  "the commonweal,"  or "sound policy"-therefore,  to stand against
public  opinion,  against the majority.  We  honor his ability  to  manipulate  the
electorate  in  service  of such  noble  ends.  We  even  go  so  far  as  to  tell  one
another  that  the  people  "cry  out"-the  image  of  people  "crying  out"  is  a
revealing  one-for  such  leadership.  The  people,  we  want  to  believe,  are
desperate  to give away  their power,  to  give up government  responsive  to them;
they yearn,  we  proclaim,  for enlightened leaders  like us to take over.
Yet we don't fully believe it.  Insecurity excites us to imagine  that the mass
of ordinary people,  as a brute force,  may  be on the verge of taking things into
their own  incompetent  hands.  Like old  colonial  administrators,  we  think  we
hear drums beating, unseen,  in the darkened  bushes.  With an election pending,.
we worry  that  it's "a  crazy  year,"  it's weird  "out  there."  When  incumbents
lose office, we say they were  "swept out" by a great "wave,"  a "tide"-a force
without face or reason.  We gasp about "the tabloids,"  about  "the talk shows,"
media  that seem to engage  ordinary  people.  When  citizens,  in huge numbers,
phone their representatives,  we wring our hands over "telephone democracy.""
Condemning  opponents, we charge  them with the high crime  of stirring up  the
people,  particularly  by raising  "divisive"  issues.  Thus  Democrats  charge  that
Republicans  "divide"  us  by  questioning  affirmative  action,  and  Republicans
pronounce  that Democrats  "divide"  us by  raising issues of class.  Our anxiety
appears so intense as to make us imagine that around us are traitors-traitors to
48.  The  ideal  image  of politics  as  a  "noble  profession"  has  been  current  at  least  since  the
Kennedy administration,  with  its retrospective,  nostalgic, but potent gloss as  "Camelot."
49.  In  the  first  two  weeks of the  Clinton  presidency,  there  was  a great  deal  of such  hand
wringing.  See,  e.g.,  Howard  Fineman,  The Power  of Talk, NEWSWEEK,  Feb.  8,  1993, at 24.
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our  very own class,  "the governing class." 50
To  the extent that  anxiety overcomes  us, we  shift from our celebration  of
"noble leaders"  to a different form of scorn  for ordinary political energy.  This
involves,  on  one hand,  mockery  of political actors,  often with knowing  irony,
often  with  open  delight,  putting  particular  stress  on  their  supposed  lack  of
intelligence.  For instance, when then-Vice President Quayle misspelled 'potato',
his error  inspired  weeks of public laughter among the  "well-educated  class. ,
5 1
Along  with  such  mockery  of  ordinary  people  in  politics  there  goes,  in
counterpoint,  a  grander  motif of high-minded disdain.  It indulges  the fantasy
of political narcissism.  In this vein, we project ourselves into a government-of-
the-imagination-one  that transcends  politics and  ordinary people.  We  debate
state "policy"  in sober tones as though it was ours alone to make.  With respect,
we  consider  what  "thoughtful  observers"-that  is,  one  another-recommend.
The imaginary  process is so refined  that we no longer even call  it government.
We  speak,  instead,  of "governance."  What  distinguishes  the two seems  to be
that  "governance"  is  a  blessedly  pure  affair,  an  affair  free  of  any  taint  by
ordinary  political energy.
5 2
If the dominant sensibility of conventional constitutional discourse is indeed
based  in these attitudes,  why should that move  us to imagine ordinary  political
energy and-in turn-constitutional law any differently?  There are two reasons.
The  first is simply how unattractive we appear when we look in this mirror.  If
we  stop and  think about the  rancid pomposity of the cliches  we repeat  and the
poses that we strike, imagining we are the governing class,  we should be moved
to reimagine  a lot of what we now take for  granted.  Perhaps a piece of fiction
-like  Mario and the Magician  can  spur us on.  Celebrating  "noble leadership,"
we  ought  to  see  Cipolla  in  the mirror.  In  our  mockery of ordinary  political
actors  and our fantasy of "governance,"  we ought to recognize the self-isolation
of the haughty narrator  in Mann's story.
50.  Remember  the  near-hysterical  adjectives  chosen  in  1992-"crazy,"  "wacko,"
"wildman"-to dismiss candidates who  were  identified as  offering strong  "populist"  appeals to the
voters:  Ross  Perot,  Jerry  Brown,  Pat  Buchanan.  Then,  recall  the condemnations  of the  other
candidates (especially, President  Bush) who raised  issues-"emotional" issues about "values"-th'at
the  "governing class"  proclaimed  (with  a  bizarre but  very  familiar  self-confidence)  were  not "the
real  issues."
51.  How  do  you  suppose  the  laughter  struck  all  the  ordinary people  who  may  not  be  such
perfect  spellers?-  Maybe  that was  the  laughter's point.  Maybe  the  mockery was  really  aimed  at
ordinary people,  and Quayle's offense was to  resemble them.
52.  Whether  or  not they're  aware  of the  Leninist  origins  of the  idea,  many  members of the
"well-educated"  minority today envision themselves as a sort of "vanguard  party,"  insulated from
"the  people"  who  don't know  their  own  "true"  interests.  This  self-image  runs through the two
versions  of  disdain  for  ordinary  political  energy  that  I've just  sketched-and,  in  its  activist
connotation,  it  may capture the attitude  better than the  image  I've employed,  that  of a  "governing
class."
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But more important is the other reason.  It is more practical.  It is that the
elite attitudes nurturing the sensibility of constitutional discourse are poisonous
to  our  society  and  our  polity.  They  reinforce  a  trend,  already  afoot,  of
"secession"  by  "the  well-educated,"  the privileged minority,  from intercourse
with ordinary people-whether  at work  or at school or  in local communities-
that  is  eroding  not  only  public  services  and  resources,  but  the  very  idea  of
connection  among  citizens.53  What  is  worse,  these  attitudes  reinforce,  even
inspire,  another  trend.  The disdain  felt  by elites  for  ordinary political  energy
is not,  after  all,  lost on ordinary  people.  They pick it up from  many  sources.
How  can it  help,  then,  but fuel  their  alienation,  much  discussed  over the past
two  decades,  from  the  political  process-and  from government  itself?54  The
poison which is  spread  by  the attitudes  in question here  thus threatens nothing
less basic  than the legitimacy of our political system,  something that,  from the
viewpoint of constitutional  law,  ought  to matter.
The  third  (and  final)  source  of  resistance  to  re-imagination  of  the
assumptions underlying our discourse about constitutional law is, probably,  the
most  intractable.  For it involves  an insistence  that those  assumptions  are not
just assumptions,  but facts.  This  insistence  is  rooted  in  the  most  potent  of
emotions-fear.  And  it  is  supported  by  the  most  reassuring  of warranties-
contemporary  consensus,  at  least  among  "opinion  makers."  What  it  comes
down  to is a belief that the political energy of the majority of ordinary  people
is dangerous, not simply incompetent,  unstable and so on.  The belief is that the
majority,  if given  free  reign,  is  prejudiced,  intolerant  and  tyrannical.  The
belief,  further,  is that  majority  power  most  threatens  the  most  vulnerable  of
us-nonconformist individuals; racial, religious and other minorities; indeed, any
and  all  "victimized,"  "disadvantaged,"  or  "unpopular"  persons  and  groups.
That this is so is taken to have been demonstrated conclusively,  time and again.
Why bother,  then,  even  to consider seeing things differently?
In the face of so adamant  a conviction,  the best  that can  be done is,  first,
to pick  at its exaggeration  and,  next,  to  try  redirecting  some  of its  emotional
current.  This might be undertaken  in detail,  reaching out to history,  sociology,
public  opinion  studies,  and the  like.  Or,  it  might be  undertaken  quickly  and
schematically,  seeking to unsettle the settled belief-to open it just enough  to let
in some  fresh air.  I am simply going to do  that.
To attribute much past or present oppression to "majorities"  is,  first of all,
53.  For a  couple of interesting  accounts  of the trend,  see  ROBERT  R.  REICH,  THE WORK  OF
NATIONS  268-300 (1991);  MICKEY  KAUS,  THE END  OF EQUALITY  25-57 (1992).
54.  For recent  portrayals  of this  trend,  see  THOMAS  BYRNE  EDSALL  & MARY  D.  EDSALL,
CHAIN  REACTION  (1991);  E.J.  DIONNE,  JR.,  THE WAR  AGAINST  PUBLIC  LIFE:  WHY  AMERICANS
HATE  POLITICS (1991).
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a ridiculous exaggeration.  Majorities rarely  rule at all.  Certainly,  they almost
never  rule directly.  When believers in "majority  tyranny"  imagine their worst
fear,  they aren't thinking of a New England town meeting.  What they probably
have  in  mind  is  a  mob.  But  why  equate  a  mob  with  the  majority?  Some
ordinary people may be in it.  In any actual situation, however,  many  more are
not.  Indeed,  when it comes to engagement  in political action,  the one thing you
can count  on  a numerical  majority  to do-for better or  for worse-is:  almost
nothing.  Most oppression,  then,  is the work of minorities.  And much of it is
the work of elite minorities-refined, well-educated-whose  hands tend,  in real
life, to clutch the immediate levers of power.  Might it not follow that,  in order
to counter the minorities that oppress vulnerable persons and groups,  we should
foster-rather  than fear-the political energy  of a force which might manage  to
check  them:  the majority of ordinary  people?
But perhaps  the fear that drives  the belief at issue here  isn't really fear  of
majority power.  Perhaps,  instead,  it  is  fear  of political  energy  per se-on
grounds  that any  energetic  political  activity  is  very likely  to  call  up  the  most
irrational  and most hostile elements  in ordinary human nature.  Or,  perhaps,  it
is  fear  of  indirect  influence  of majority  opinion  on  the  government-on  the
grounds that ordinary people tend to be deeply prejudiced and  intolerant.  How
might  these  more  plausible  convictions  be  neutralized?  The  argument  most
likely to  be "heard"  is one that speaks  to the  most essential  fear  that motivates
them-the  fear of prejudice.
One  especially  striking  characteristic  of  both  convictions  is  that  they
themselves  manifest prejudice.  They put forth a hostile stereotype.  They would
make  use of the  stereotype  to  repress,  on  one hand,  attempts  to  shake up  the
political status quo,  and,  on  the other hand,  attempts  to make government more
responsive to average citizens who lack the means of influence available to more
powerful  interests.  They  tend  to  be  held  by  people  who  do  not  imagine
themselves  to be "ordinary,"  indeed who imagine  themselves as (at least a little)
better (at least in some respect) than ordinary.  Like most prejudice, that is,  they
mobilize  bias against the stereotyped  group,  to the advantage of the prejudiced
group.
But  why  view  generalizations  about  supposedly  dangerous  attributes  of
ordinary  human  beings in politics as prejudice rather  than as  fact?  Again,  it's
the exaggeration  that  is  the  tip-off.  Whenever  an  exaggerated  generalization
mobilizes  bias against  some other "type"  of person-or a "type"  of activity by
such  a  person-we  should  at  the  very  least  suspect  prejudice.5   The
exaggeration on display here is obvious.  Surely, the exertion of political energy
55.  See ELY, supra  note 35,  at  157-58.
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is not-in and of itself-incipiently tyrannical.  (Think about the Constitutional
Convention  of 1787.)  Nor is the exertion of such  energy  by  ordinary people.
(Think  of the Revolution  or the Abolitionists or the Civil Rights  Movement.)
When  we  make  sweeping  claims  about  tendencies  of  majority  opinion  to
intolerance,  we  display  the same  kind of exaggeration.  When we  assume  the
majority  is biased,  in fact,  we  often turn out to be wrong.  (Recall  the  failure
of the appeals  to anti-gay  sentiment at the  1992 Republican  Convention.)  We
frequently  dismiss majority opinion as  founded on nothing but prejudice-when
it plainly is more  complicated-simply  in order  to emphasize  our disagreement
with it.  (Recall  the controversy  in the  early  1970s over busing  and  "law  and
order.")  Even  the most  clich&l  example  of the alleged bias of the majority  of
ordinary  people-the  rise  of Nazism-is  questionable:  the Nazis,  remember,
never won a majority in a free and fair election.'  Of course,  this is not to say
that the majority  is not often  biased.  Nor is  it to say that it's any less-or any
more-prejudiced  than the  "well-educated"  elites. 57  It is to say  that such broad
claims about general attributes of ordinary people are biased exaggerations.  To
the extent,  then,  that we  reject  prejudice,  we ought  to eschew  this one.
What  is more, minorities who are themselves  objects of prejudice ought to
be able  to  sympathize with the majority.  For  many  of the denigrating  images
projected  onto  the  majority  are  the  very  ones  projected  onto  the  minority.
Certain  racial  minorities  and  women,  for  instance,  know  how  it  feels  to  be
depicted  as  childish,  irrational,  emotional,  ignorant,  irresponsible,  and  so  on.
They  ought  to  be  the  last  to  apply just  the  same  insults  to  the  majority  of
ordinary people.
5
1
D.  Doing a  "Double Take"
Overcoming-or  relaxing-resistance  to  a  re-imagination  of  root
assumptions of constitutional  law  is  one thing.  Actual  willingness to  try such
re-imagination  is another.  For if you  have  no notion  of what  doing  a double
take on ordinary political energy might mean  for constitutional law,  you will be
unlikely to do it.  What you want is a clear idea of what difference  the Populist
sensibility  might  make.  But  because  it  is  a  sensibility-rather  than  a  set  of
56.  The  same goes  for  the  other great  disaster  (measured  in terms  of human  lives) in  our
century-the  rise to power of Bolshevism.
57.  No doubt,  "well-educated"  elites tend  to have different modes of self-presentation,  and  so
might not voice prejudice  as the majority does,  but does anyone seriously contend  that these  elites
have not,  time and again,  manifested prejudices of every sort?
58.  At  a  meeting  of the  Harvard  Law  School  faculty  in  early  1993,  one  of  my  colleagues
denounced  the harassment of women on  the street  "by  rude blue  collar types."  He was not aware
of the  prejudice  he  was retailing.  The voicing of prejudice  of that  sort, as  a  matter of fact,  is
generally unnoticed in such  "polite"  society.  (What  if he had said,  "rude  Hispanic types"  or "rude
Jewish types"?)
Parker: "Here, the People Rule":  A Constitutional Populist Manifesto
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  27
principles-it doesn't have  "entailments"  to enumerate  for your inspection.
What I'll do  is  sketch one path the Populist sensibility might inspire us  to
blaze  through constitutional argument.  It's a path that attracts  me.  My point,
however,  is not to privilege it.  Nor am  I sketching  it to permit you to express
shock  and reject  all I've had  to say.  Instead,  I offer it  as  an  example,  a very
open-textured  example.  There  is .lots of room  to  argue  within  its  obviously
vague  terms-just as  there is  lots of room to argue  for blazing  different  paths
inspired by the Populist sensibility.  An advantage of approaching  constitutional
law  through  issues  of  sensibility  is,  indeed,  that  it  keeps  us  focused  on  the
historical truth that "the  law"  is no  more or less than argument  without end.
To begin with, I'll mark out a couple  of initial precepts.  The most basic
is  to  restate  my  exclusion  of  both  the  "romantic"  and  the  "counter-culture"
perversions  of  the  Populist  sensibility.  Both  would  tend  to  encourage  a
development  of distinctions  between  attributes  as  "suited"  and  "unsuited"  to
active  participation  in  politics-hence,  reproducing,  in  a  revised  form,
Anti-Populist  repressions of ordinary  political  energy.  A  distinctive Populist
approach,  I believe,  should make no such discriminations.  It ought to favor-as
a first precept,  subject to limitations implicit in the precept which I'll suggest in
a  while-the  exertion  of  all  sorts  of  political  energy,  "reasonable"  or
"passionate,"  "deliberative"  or  "impulsive,"  "civilized"  or "vulgar." 59
The other  basic  precept  faces  the  issue  of what  favoring  all  this  energy
ought  to  mean.  To  favor  the  exertion of political  energy  isn't to  require  it.
Those  who  don't  participate  in  political  life  should  not  be  penalized,  since
compelled behavior is not exactly a release of energy.  Neither, however,  should
they be insulated  in their privacy,  protected  from exposure to politics.  Rather,
they  should be  both enabled and encouraged to  take some  part.  This  implies
that they  should be given opportunities to  take an effective part,  to get involved
in ways  that  may  make  some difference.  And  this implies,  in  turn,  the  most
fundamental  requirement.  Government  must  not  only  be  responsible  to  the
people.  That is not enough.  It, above all,  must be responsive to them-and not
just occasionally,  but systematically,  responsive.
Stated  so  abstractly,  these  simple  precepts  might  not  be  too  hard  to
swallow.  But,  once  elaborated  as  I  propose  to  elaborate  them,  they  surely
become  controversial.  For,  if generally embraced,  they would institute the sort
of reorientation  of discourse about constitutional  law that  has occurred,  in  this
century,  in  the  1900s,  the  1930s,  and the  1960s-that is  to say,  more or  less,
59.  Thus  Bruce  Ackerman  is  partly  right  about  me:  I  am  not  what  he  calls  a  "dualist."
However,  as will become clear,  I don't fit  into the pigeonhole-as a  "monistic  democrat"-he puts
me in either.  1  BRUCE  ACKERMAN,  WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS  9  (1991).
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every  three  decades.
The  pivot of this  reorientation  would  be  a  revised  understanding  of the
central  mission,  or  purpose,  of  modem  constitutional  law.  Put  simply,  the
mission  ought to be  to promote  majority rule.  More  fully,  the  goal  inspiring
argument about "interpretation"  of the Constitution ought to be government of,
for, and-to the extent it is feasible-by the majority of the people.  Of course,
this is simply an ideal.  There  is no such entity  as "the  majority."'  Yet as  an
ideal,  it's no more vaporous than the alternatives.  And, at least in its emphasis,
it poses  a sharp  contrast  to them.  To say  the mission of the law is to promote
majority  rule is not the same as to  say it is to protect  "individual  freedom"  or'
"discrete  and insular  minorities"  against  "the majority."  As an ideal,  what  is
more,  it  conveys  a  powerful  claim:  that  "common"  people,  ordinary
people-not  their "betters,"  not somebody  else's conception  of their supposed
"better selves"-are  the ones who are entitled to govern  our country.
To be sure,  affirmation of majority rule has long been a staple of talk about
constitutional law.  But the power of its simple claim has been sucked  out of it.
Restoration of that power is the aim of a Populist reorientation of constitutional
discourse.
The ideal  of majority rule  has been sucked dry  in two ways.  In service of
"realism,"  first of all,  the majority  has  been  reduced  to  coalitions of interest
groups6  ruling at a  level  removed  from  much  involvement or influence-even
from  the  knowledge-of  ordinary  people.62   What  is  lost,  thereby,  is  any
attention  to social  class  or status as well  as to growing  frustration of ordinary
political energy.  In Washington,  elite "spokesmen"  or "advocates"  for interest
groups come together and are labelled the "majority."  Lost, then,  is the critical
force of the ideal.  At the same time,  in service of fantasy,  it has been given an
apologetic  spin.  It  has  been  invoked  routinely  to  suggest  that  ours  is-and
always  has been-a  polity in  which  "the  majority  rules."63  So  it has fostered
a  "hiatus"'  in  constitutional  discourse.  Inspired by  the  Populist  sensibility,
60.  At best,  majorities form and re-form  from time to  time and  from issue to issue.
61.  A locus classicus  was  ROBERT  A.  DAHL,  A  PREFACE  TO  DEMOCRACTIC  THEORY  (1956).
Citing it,  Alexander  Bickel  reduced majority rule  to "'minorities  rule.'"  ALEXANDER  M.  BICKEL,
THE LEAST  DANGEROUS BRANCH  18-19 (1962).  Plainly,  any group can be divided into any number
of sub-groups, delineated by any number of traits.  No one line of division is mandated by a law of
nature.  The question  is which  traits,  and how many of them,  we  decide to focus on for  purposes
of constitutional  argument-and why.
62.  See WILLIAM  GREIDER,  WHO  WILL TELL THE PEOPLE (1992).
63.  See supra text accompanying note  33; see also BICKEL,  supra note 61,  at  19.
64.  The term  is Gordon Wood's, who  traces the  "hiatus"  back to the  constitutional rhetoric  of
the Federalists.  GORDON  WOOD,  THE CREATION  OF THE  AMERICAN  REPUBLIC  1776-1787,  at 562
(1969).
Parker: "Here, the People Rule":  A Constitutional Populist Manifesto
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993574  VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  27
however,  we can  revive the ideal,  infusing it with sensitivity to social strata and
political energy,  sharpening  its critical edge.  And,  seeing  that the majority,  so
envisioned,  does  not rule, we can  turn this ideal of democracy-the  mission to
pursue it,  that is-into the engine of a new era of constitutional  activism.
How, then,  through constitutional argument,  might we criticize  failures of
majority rule?  On what sorts of occasions?  Using what sorts of standards?  The
only  real  answer-anathema  to  today's  academics-is:  Who  knows?
Mapping  is  largely  a  retrospective  business,'  or else  it  is  hubris.67  What  I
can suggest are certain general  directions that argument ought to try and certain
examples of "settled"  issues that ought to be scheduled for an early "unsettling."
Just  as a  reinvigorated  ideal  of majority rule  is  generated by  the Populist
attitude  favoring  exertion  of  ordinary  political  energy,  so  a  reoriented
constitutional  argument  promoting  majority  rule  should  direct  its  criticism  at
behavior-action or inaction-that tends to frustrate opportunity for the effective
exertion of ordinary  political  energy.  It should  extend  its criticism  not just to
behavior  which  impedes  the  summoning  and  expression  of  energy,  but  to
behavior  which  insulates  authority  from  it  as  well.  Thus,  if officials  set
themselves  so  high  "above"  ordinary  opinion  as to  fail  even to  engage with it
(think of Mann's  narrator),  they deserve  constitutional  criticism.  If, instead,
they engage with it only by manipulating  it (think of Cipolla),  they deserve  the
same constitutional  criticism.
But  wait  a  minute,  you  say:  Such  argument,  in  the  name  of  the
Constitution,  is way  out of bounds.  That  is  true.  It  is beyond  the present
bounds of argument.  This is characteristic of any reorientation of the law-and,
as I've said,  we have already  gone through three reorientations  in this century.
It's  also  a  characteristic  of  such  moments  that  the  orthodox  overstate  every
departure  from  established  practice.  To  be  sure,  in  the  reorientation  I  am
suggesting,  constitutional argument would  have to be reshaped  to grapple  with
hard,  controversial  issues.  It  would  have  to  gauge  the  effects  of  official
behavior on the political opportunity of ordinary people.  It would also have  to
examine  the  politics  behind  official  behavior.  However,  constitutional
arguments  facing  up  to  such  questions  are  not  wholly  unfamiliar.  They  are
65.  See supra  text accompanying notes  36-40.  Yesterday's academics,  however,  understood
that doctrine  is  developed-in activist  moments particularly-through  a groping,  sometimes  bold,
sometimes  cautious, always incremental,  imperfect process.  See,  e.g.,  BICKEL,  supra note  61; Jan
G.  Deutsch,  Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Coutr:  Some Intersections  Between Law and
Political Science,  20 STAN.  L.  REV.  169,  188-90 (1968).  1 like  to compare it to the  "fog  of war.-
In war,  one needs a general  strategy, but  a blueprint is, at best, fatuous.
66.  John Ely's book is the best contemporary  example.  ELY,  supra  note 35.
67.  For a recent example,  see  RICHARD  A.  EPSTEIN,  TAKINGS  (1985).
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already  well  known,  for  example,  under  the  Establishment  Clause'  and  the
Equal  Protection  Clause'  and  the  guarantee  of Freedom  of Association?0  I
am just suggesting that they be put to a new use, that they be used toward a new
end.
Let me  point to a couple, at least,  of those new uses.  The reorientation  of
the law,  first of all,  ought to encourage the development of novel constitutional
claims,  some of which  have  already  been  made  but  failed  to  flourish.  Most
significant  might  be  frontal  challenges  to  processes  of  "insider
trading"-solicitation  of funds,  lawyer-lobbying,  favors  to  powerful  interests,
secret wheeling  and dealing-that  estrange ordinary people  from government.71
Then,  more generally,  deference to government  in any situation might be made
to depend  on argument  about whether the processes  that produced  the behavior
in question deserve deference  in fact.  That,  in turn,  might be made to  depend
not  simply on  whether  the  officials  knew  what  they  were  deciding, 
7  but on
whether they adequately opened the process to-and responded to-citizens other
than  professional  "spokesmen"  and  hand-picked  "witnesses."  Similarly,
deference  might  turn-in  the  case  of  referenda,  for  example-on  argument
concerning the ways public opinion was manipulated by elites.  Such argument,
it  is  clear,  would  raise  issues  of definition,  fact,  and  degree;  very  complex
issues.  But any more  so  than those involved in "applying"  the  Constitution to
manage  a school  system?'
A second kind of use to which  reoriented  constitutional argument ought to
be  put  involves  the  ways  we  evaluate  constitutional  "rights"  of  political
68.  See,  e.g.,  Edwards v.  Aguillard,  482  U.S.  578  (1987);  Wallace v.  Jaffree,  472  U.S.  38
(1985);  Lynch  v.  Donnelly,  465  U.S.  668,  687  (1984)  (O'Connor,  J.,  concurring);  Lemon  v.
Kurtzman,  403  U.S.  602 (1971).
69.  See,  e.g.,  Hunter v.  Underwood,  471  U.S.  222 (1985);  Rogers v.  Lodge,  458  U.S.  613
(1982);  United States R.R.  Retirement Bd.  v.  Fritz,  449  U.S.  166,  190-91  (1980)  (Brennan, J.,
dissenting);  Bullock v.  Carter,  405  U.S.  134  (1972);  Williams  v.  Rhodes,  393  U.S.  23  (1968);
Harper v. Virginia  Bd.  of Elections,  383  U.S.  663  (1966).
70.  See,  e.g.,  Elrod v.  Bums,  427 U.S.  347 (1976).
71.  When  faced  with  such  suggested arguments,  lawyers tend  to  delay  (or avoid)  coming to
grips  with  them by  focusing  on what  constitutional provisions  such  arguments  would  be  "made
under."  The  sort  of argument  I'm  suggesting  can  comfortably  be  "made  under"  the  Equal
Protection  Clause,  the Right  to  Petition Clause,  or  even the Due  Process Clauses.  See Hans  A.
Linde,  Due Process  ofLawmaking, 55 NEB.  L.  REV.  197, 235-51  (1976).  Needless to say,  Buckley
v. Valeo,  424 U.S.  1 (1976)-and its progeny-wouldbe  overruled  "under" the Free Speech Clause.
72.  See  United States R.R.  Retirement Bd.  v.  Fritz,  449 U.S.  166,  191-93  (1980)  (Brennan,
J.,  dissenting).
73.  See  Abram Chayes,  The  Role of the Judge in Public Law Liigation, 89  HARV.  L.  REV.
1281  (1976).  To mention one more example:  Argument about term limits for legislators should not
focus on wooden assertions about "preemption"  or "ballot access" for longtime incumbents.  Rather,
it should focus on whether such limitations are likely, as a matter of fact,  to promote a reinvigorated
majority rule.
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participation.  Animated  by  a  Populist  sensibility,  we  might  adjust argument
about these issues-rights to vote, to speak,  to associate-on  three dimensions.
Considering basic opportunities for participation,  we might skip abstract  talk of
"the  right"  to  vote or speak  and ask  how effective  particular opportunities are
in  fact likely  to be  for ordinary  people.74  How  easy  is  it  for them  to  register
to vote?  Is it likely that they can reach  relevant audiences in a specific  "public
forum.""5  Is  the  state  providing  them  the  "basic"  education  necessary  for
political  participation?76   Then,  considering  how  government  may  regulate
political  activity,  we  might  go  beyond  argument  about  the  weight  of
governmental  interests  or the neutrality among points of view of governmental
policy.  We might argue also about the regulation's distributive  impact on people
in different social strata-insisting,  at the least,  that the government  be neutral
in  this  respect  as  well.'  Finally,  in  talking  about  rights  of  political
participation,  we  might  focus  on  what  are  really  the  most  basic  questions:
questions of fact.  Are  the rights actually being exercised?  By  whom?  How
much?  How effectively?  Are ordinary people effectively taking part in politics?
If not,  why not?  Paying attention  to these issues of fact would,  indeed,  work
a transformation  of the practice of constitutional  argument  about  rights.
What drives  the Populist approach  to rights of political  participation  is an
important adjustment in the imaginative substructure of contemporary argument
about them-an adjustment that ought to unsettle a large chunk of the edifice  of
free  speech  law  in  particular.  The adjustment  is  in  the  image  of the  sort of
person who exercises-that is, whom we like to think of as exercising-freedom
of speech.  Specifically,  constitutional  argument seems  to have  found  it hard  to
imagine ordinary people in that role.  It has tended to privilege those modes and
styles  of  expression  associated  with  the  "better"  sort  of  people-relatively
74.  See Richard D.  Parker, The Effective Enjoyment of  Rights, in  CRITICAL  LEGAL THOUGHT:
AN  AMERICAN-GERMAN  DEBATE 485  (Christian Joerges  & David M.  Trubeck eds.,  1989).
75.  See,  e.g.,  Clark v.  Community  for  Creative  Non-Violence,  468  U.S.  288,  301  (1984)
(Marshall,  J.,  dissenting);  Perry  Educ.  Ass'n v.  Perry  Local Educator's  Ass'n,  460 U.S.  37,  55
(1983)  (Brennan, J.,  dissenting);  Amalgamated  Food  Employees v.  Logan  Valley Plaza,  391  U.S.
308 (1968).
76.  See Playlerv.  Doe, 457 U.S.  202 (1982);  San Antonio Indep. Sch.  Dist. v.  Rodriguez, 411
U.S.  1,  35-37 (1973).  After a decade or two in which expenditure on our public  schools has vastly
increased  and the capacity of the  schools  to deliver  the  most basic  education  has  collapsed,  why
don't  we  see  that  that  presents  one  of the  fundamental  constitutional  issues  of our time?  For
shocking statistics,  see  R.  HUGHES,  THE  CULTURE OF  COMPLAINT 61-67 (1993).
77.  See,  e.g.,  FEC  v.  National  Conservative  Political  Action Commit.,  470  U.S.  480,  495
(1985);  Kovacs v. Cooper,  336  U.S.  77,  102-03  (1949)  (Black,  J.,  dissenting).  The  (unrealizable
but inspirational)  ideal  might be to extend the  one person, one vote principle  through all  forms  of
political activity.
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"reasonable,"  "orderly,"  "articulate"  speech  having  "social  importance."'
Sometimes,  when  an ordinary  person's  speech  is  protected,  it  is belittled.  In
one of his "great"  dissents,  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes called the people he
voted to protect  "puny anonymities"  and argued  that a  "silly leaflet"  posed no
danger to anyone.'  In more recent  years,  the right to hear others  speak seems
to  have  been  exalted  to  a  status  equal  to  the  right  to  speak  oneself-perhaps
because it is more appropriate  to ordinary people who need to hear, bitt need not
be heard.'  (Mann's  narrator  would certainly  embrace  such  a  sentiment.)  Of
course,  there  has  been  a  counter-theme  in  free  speech  argument.8"  It  has,
however,  been subordinate,  and increasingly so.  High on the reoriented  agenda
ought to be a turning of these tables.
Once they are turned-once promotion of ordinary political energy  is seen
to  be  paramount-several  particular  free  speech  doctrines  would  be  deeply
undermined.  The  "fighting words"  doctrine,  for instance,  was  constructed  in
part upon the assertion that such words  "are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas and are  of  . . . slight social  value as  a step  to  truth."
8 2  This attitude
is embarrassingly prissy.  What is worse,  it discriminates against expressions  of
ordinary  energy,  "uninhibited,  robust  . . . wide-open,"  and  often
confrontational,  too. 3  Another  doctrine  that  would  be  undercut  involves
special  protection  for  the  press,  on  grounds of its  purported  "function"  as  a
"surrogate"  or a  "fiduciary"  for  the (presumably)  passive consuming  public. 4
78.  See,  e.g.,  Young v.  American Mini  Theaters,  427 U.S.  50 (1976);  Spence v.  Washington,
418  U.S.  405,  409-11  (1974);  Paris  Adult Theatre  I  v.  Slaton,  413  U.S.  49  (1973);  Brown  v.
Louisiana, 383  U.S.  131  (1966);  Teamsters  Union 695  v.  Vogt, Inc.,  354 U.S.  284  (1957).
79.  Abrams v.  United States, 250 U.S.  616,  628-29 (1919)  (Holmes,  J.,  dissenting).
80.  At  first  blush,  focusing  on  the  rights  of consumers  of  speech  might  appear  to  foster
promotion of the rights of its producers.  But,  if an audience  is described  as  "captive"  or "hostile,"
its  "right"  not to  listen  can  limit  speech.  See,  e.g.,  Lehman v.  Shaker  Heights,  418  U.S.  298
(1974);  Public Utils.  Comm'n v.  Pollak,  343 U.S.  451  (1952);  Feiner v.  New York,  340 U.S.  315
(1951).  More importantly, and  more recently,  a focus on the audience has been invoked to frustrate
regulations  designed  to promote equality in the  marketplace  of ideas.  See,  e.g.,  First Nat'i  Bank
of Boston v.  Bellotti,  435  U.S.  765 (1978).  And protection of at least  one sort of speech has been
based on its  "value  to consumers."  See Zauder  v. Office  of Disciplinary Counsel,  471  U.S.  626
(1985).  The  real  significance  of the focus on consumption,  however,  is less operational than as  a
hint of shift in  the imaginative  substructure  of argument.
81.  See, e.g.,  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.  886 (1982);  Cohen v. California,
403  U.S.  15  (1971)  .
82.  Chaplinsky  v. New Hampshire,  315  U.S.  568,  572 (1942).
83.  New York Times v.  Sullivan,  376 U.S.  254, 270 (1964);  Terminiello v.  Chicago, 337 U.S.
1 (1949).  In  its  analysis of  a  "fighting  words"  problem  last year,  the  Court  confined  itself  to
consideration  of "content"  discrimination  alone.  R.A.V.  v.  City  of St.  Paul,  112  S.  Ct.  2538
(1992).
84.  See,  e.g.,  Richmond  Newspapers,  Inc.  v.  Virginia,  448  U.S.  555  (1980);  Saxbe  v.
Washington  Post Co.,  417 U.S.  843,  850  (1974)  (Powell,  J.,  dissenting).  Even  more egregiously
elitist arguments of this sort-for instance, arguments by artists for special protection on "fiduciary"
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Another radically  limits the right of subordinates (workers,  students) to  speak
up to superiors (bosses,  teachers) inside hierarchical  institutions.8"  Hierarchical
organizations,  in  fact,  might  find their  own  associational  freedoms  curtailed.
Thus the decision upholding the suppression of the Communist Party, a decision
now widely  reviled,  might be reaffirmed.86
But  enough  about  freedom  of  speech.  What  about  racial  and  gender
discrimination?  Affirmative  action?  Privacy?  Abortion?  On these  issues,  a
Populist  sensibility may not be perfectly politically correct.  To begin  with,  it
does not  imagine them as locked  in at the  absolute center  of the constitutional
universe.  Rather,  it would  approach  them  from  the  perspective  of  its own
central  concern-promotion  of  reinvigorated  majority  rule.  And,  from  that
perspective,  it would illuminate issues that lie beneath,  and cut across,  the ones
that recently  have dominated constitutional  law.
From a Populist perspective, there are no subjects that should be absolutely,
categorically, barred from majority rule.  Indeed,  in an ideal regime of majority
rule,  every  issue  ought  to  be  a  political  issue,  open  to  political  controversy.
Short  of  the  ideal-which  is  where  we  are-political  regulation  of  any
subject-whether  race,  gender,  privacy,  abortion  or whatever-ought  to  face
precisely  the same sort of constitutional  criticism I've sketched  already.
I'll sketch it once more,  this time citing two of the great modern arguments
for  racial  equality  as  models  for  the  two  main  standards  of  Populist
constitutional  criticism.  Faced  with any official  behavior,  we should look first
at the politics behind it.  Specifically,  as  in Loving  v.  Virginia, we  should look
to  see  if this behavior was  generated  by  an entrenched  system  of domination
whereby  certain  self-styled  "superiors,"  with a  lock  on the  political  process,
exclude,  insulate themselves  from and put down certain  "inferiors."  In  Loving,
the  system  generating  the  regulation  at  issue  was  a  system  of  "White
supremacy. " 7  Next,  we  should  consider  the  effects  of challenged  behavior;
its practical  effects on one's  opportunity to participate-to promote  and defend
grounds-ought to be  aborted before reaching the point of viability.
85.  See, e.g.,  Hazelwood Sch.  Dist.  v.  Kuhlmeier,  484 U.S.  260  (1988);  Minnesota  Bd.  for
Community Colleges v.  Knight,  465  U.S.  271  (1984);  Connick v.  Myers, 461  U.S.  138  (1983).
86.  Dennis v.  United  States,  341  U.S.  494 (1951).  See International  Longshoremen's  Ass'n
v.  Allied  Int'l,  456  U.S.  212  (1982); Pope,  supra note  39,  at 351-52.
87.  388  U.S.  1, 7-11  (1967).  From  a  Populist perspective,  criticism  of the politics  behind
official  behavior would be  rather different from currently dominant  modes of criticism that  tend to
stress prejudice.  Sure,  prejudice against a group-any group-would be  a consideration,  but not,
by  itself,  decisive.  Other  considerations-actual  political  leverage,  social  and  economic
resources-would tend to be  more  important.  Cf  ELY,  supra note  35,  at  135-79.  What is more,
there might be  a tendency to unpack  groups defined  by race  or gender or  whatever and  focus on
social divisions and  political inequalities among their  "members."
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one's values  and  one's interests-in politics.  Thus,  as  in  Brown v.  Board of
Education,  we  ought to  condemn  behavior  if,  in effect,  it deprives  anyone of
something  that  is  basic  to  opportunity  for  full,  fair  participation  in  "our
democratic  society."'  How powerful an argument can be made  in these terms
to protect,  for instance,  easy  access  to  abortions,  I  am not sure.  All  we  can
estimate is the extent of the leeway  for argument.  And, here,  it is broad  indeed.
Nevertheless,  the  fact  remains  that  what  I  am  suggesting  is  a
"process-oriented"  kind of constitutional  argument.  Its mission  is to  improve
the  democratic  process,  and,  while it is  animated  by controversial  choices  of
value,  this argument  does  affirm that most important controversies  ought to  be
decided  through  democratic  politics. 9  This  opens  the  argument  to  two
criticisms  which,  I  well  know,  are  always  on  the  tips of the  tongues  of the
distinguished inhabitants of legal academia.
First  of all,  if we  have  to  make  certain  controversial  value  choices  in
constitutional argument,  why not make all  value choices?  If we are  to respect
the workings of the political  process some of the time,  but not all of the time,
why not pick and choose  simply on the basis of our agreement  or disagreement
with  the political  winners?  To  the  Populist  sensibility,  the  answer  to  these
questions  is clear:  For us  to claim that every value choice ought  to be settled
through constitutional  argument  would be to  shut  out the majority  of ordinary
people who are not active participants in the process.'  To see  ourselves as  so
hierarchically  "superior"  to them-and to ordinary  politics-would be to scorn
ordinary  political  energy and  the ideal  of a  reinvigorated  majority  rule.  What
is worse,  it  might well tend to nurture  in them a  dependence  on constitutional
law-not just scorning,  but sucking  away  political energy,  evoking  passivity,
inducing enervation.9
But, secondly,  if that is the case,  where do  we get off criticizing  anything
88.  347 U.S.  483,  493-94 (1954).  It is worth remembering that the discussion of race in Brown
was  mainly  instrumental  to  the  central  claim  about  segregation's  devastating  effect  on  social,
economic,  and,  therefore,  political  opportunity.
89.  Though a  while back I wrote  an article  criticizing  John Ely's book,  which I claimed  had
.perfected"  (a specific kind of)  process-oriented argument, I  (unlike  many other critics) didn't reject
process-orientation  as  such.  To the  contrary,  I looked  forward  to a revised  process-orientation
proceeding from open confrontation of controversial issues of value and from a revised imagination
of democracy.  See Parker,  Past of Constitutional  Theory, supra note  1,  at  236-39, 258-59.
90.  Ideally, I suppose that the practice of constitutional argument would  simply be a dimension
of-or a moment in-political  controversy among  ordinary people.  But we  should recognize  that
it  has never been that.  To romanticize "the people" is  to disdain them-and, sometimes,  to establish
a predicate for rule over them.  Cf.  ACKERMAN,  supra note  59.
91.  Can  it  be  doubted that-until  the  late  1980s-the pro-choice movement's  fetishism of Roe
v. Wade tended to have this sort of enervating,  demobilizing  effect?
Parker: "Here, the People Rule":  A Constitutional Populist Manifesto
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993580  VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  27
that  is  done  through  the  political  process?  And,  in  particular,  how  can  we
permit an unelected judge,  making constitutional argument,  to order an elected
official  around?  To  a Populist sensibility,  this  is more  troubling than the first
criticism.  Hence,  it  deserves  a  more  extended-if  less  crowd  pleasing-
response.
Three question-begging answers should be put to one side.  First, it is now
usual to observe  that constitutional  argument does,  and ought to,  go on outside
courts  and, thus,  that it shouldn't be hobbled by restrictions  applicable only  to
courts.'  That is  true.  But  this fails  to  face  the issues  that are posed  in the
judicial context.  It is also usual  to insist that judicial power is less problematic
if the judges  restrain  themselves  by  "following"  some  source  of "law"  that  is
outside themselves.  But-as every  sophisticated lawyer knows and pretends not
to know-choices  among the competing sources of "law"  and among competing
implications that may be drawn  from these sources depend on assumptions about
the purpose of constitutional argument,  controversial  assumptions  that,  in turn,
depend  on controversial  assumptions  about  the world  in which  constitutional
argument goes on.  At  the bottom, as I've suggested,  are opposed sensibilities,
neither "correct"  or "incorrect."  So,  the problem remains.  Then,  finally, it is
usual  to  claim  that judicial power  is  tolerable if judges  use  it to  improve  the
"quality"  of democracy.  That  is true.  It  fails,  though,  to face  up  to the  fact
that "democracy"-and  its "quality"-are fundamentally  contested  values.
The Populist solution to the problem,  I believe,  is  to deflate  constitutional
discourse, to deflate its pretension to argue about,  and in the name  of, "higher"
law.  This means affirming-not merely conceding-that what  is at the heart of
constitutional argument is political controversy about democracy,  and about what
it can be and what  it should be.  Though the subject is important,  the terms of
argument  about  it  are  not  so  different  from  the  terms  of  ordinary  political
argument.  The contending values and interests are the same,  even if articulated
quite generally.  And no fancy "theory,"  no obsessive "methodology,"  can hide
the fact that, like any argument,  constitutional argument appeals-at bottom-to
ordinary, competing sensibilities, competing emotions.  This affirmation has two
virtues.  It takes the elitist curse off the practice  of argument.  And it is true to
experience.
The  entitlement  of  judges  to  take  a  special  part  in  the  making  of
constitutional  argument  is  a  matter  of  their  job  description.  A  further
entitlement-entitlement  to  presumptive  respect  for  arguments  they
make-requires  a  further justification.  It  can't  be  based  on  their  being  any
92.  I was one of the early ones to make this  move.  See Parker, Past of Constitutional  Theory,
supra note  1, at  259.
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"better"  or more  technically  "expert"  than anyone else.  Nor can  it be based on
their  "processes  of decisionmaking"  being  better than any  other.  Rather,  any
further entitlement is dependent on two things-the politics of their appointment
to the bench  and one personal quality:  their ordinariness.
By ordinariness,  I mean,  first, absence  of any pretense  to lofty status as an
oracle  of  a  "higher"  law;  second,  "in  tuneness"  with  what  is  ordinary  in
oneself; and,  third, a capacity  to speak to  the ordinariness  in others-to all  that
is  shared  among  all  sorts  of  people.  Sheer  brainpower,  scholarly
accomplishments,  technical proficiency-that is,  most of what are often cited as
"qualifications"-are  just  unessential.  By  the  same  token,  cleverness,
scholarship,  and  craftsmanship  in judicial  opinions  are  also unessential.93  A
couple of decades ago, a United States Senator, protesting such "qualifications,"
asked whether "mediocre"  people don't deserve one seat on  the Supreme Court.
Revising his thought a  bit,  I am saying  that  ordinary  people  ought not occupy
one seat  on  the  Court-they ought  to  fill  all  nine.  The  Court's  claim  to  our
presumptive  respect depends upon  it.'
That presumptive respect  should turn,  also, on  the politics of appointment
may strike  some  as troubling.  Wouldn't  that  "politicize"  the courts?  That  is,
wouldn't  it encourage  us to criticize judicial  decisions  in the midst of political
campaigns,  seeking  to  elect  candidates  who  promise  to  appoint  and  confirm
judges who'll bring to their work the values we embrace?  Wouldn't it mean that
the general  course  of constitutional  law-the ebb and  flow of the  assumptions
animating it-would tend to "follow the election returns"?  The answer is:  Yes,
that's the whole point.  Moreover,  it is what has been happening  for years-not
only  in  the  1930s,  but in  presidential elections  at least since  1968.  From  the
Populist perspective,  this  "politicization"  of the judiciary-if it  can  be  called
that-is not  simply  familiar,  it  is  vital  to  whatever  authority  inheres  in  the
judicial office.
What this point makes  clear is that the authority of constitutional argument
by judges is defeasible-indeed,  it ought to be challenged periodically.  Entitled
only  to  presumptive  respect,  argument  by judges,  in  the  end,  has  to  win
93.  I'm not  suggesting that  such qualities  are undesirable.  All  I'm  saying  is that they are not
essential  to  presumptive  respect  for judicial  constitutional  arguments.  I should  add  that,  from  a
populist perspective,  we  ought to expect judges  to write  their own  opinions  and  that we  ought to
applaud  the opinions  that  ordinary people-including judges on lower  courts-can  readily  grasp.
This might have the beneficial effect of downscaling the  show-off "smartness"  of opinions.
94.  When I say  that,  to  deserve presumptive  respect, judges should be  able  to  "speak  to  the
ordinariness"  in others,  I don't  mean  to exclude  the  capacity  for  "judgement"  or  "prudence"  or
strategic  calculation.  I simply mean to deprive those terms of their Anti-Populist overtones and fold
them into  a deeper and democractic  trait.  When President  Clinton referred  to  "a big heart"  as a
qualification  for a Justice,  he appeared to embrace  this idea.
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adherence  on its own.  It must  appeal  to ordinary  people.  It must  move them
to  support  it.  If they don't, it has  to  adjust and  try  once  more.95  Does  this
mean  that  it's  all  right  not  only  to  criticize  or  even  condemn  constitutional
argument  enforced  by judges,  but also  to  disobey  it?  Again,  the  answer  is:
Yes,  so long as you're prepared to face up to defeat,  and maybe punishment,  if
the  mass  of  ordinary  people  fails  to  support  or  tolerate  your  disobedience.
Ultimately,  the  judge  and  the  disobedient  dissident  are  in  just  the  same
position-each has  to try to  win over the majority.
By  now,  I  am aware  that your Anti-Populist instincts-we  all  have  them,
by  the way;  some  of us simply  try  to control  them-may  be about  to explode
into protest.  Harsh words-anarchy!  nihilism! fascism!-may  be on your  lips.
But hesitate  a  moment.  Consider the banality of what  you were  about to  say.
Consider  the  overheated  hyperbole."  Affirmation  of  the  value  of ordinary
political energy and of majority rule surely  is not nihilism.  To the contrary,  it's
one powerful  strain in the  traditional political  morality of our nation.  And the
idea  that  a  Populist sensibility  leads to  anarchy  or  fascism depends,  first,  on
images of ordinary political energy  that,  at the least,  are contestable-as  I tried
to suggest by developing the two takes on Mario and the Magician. In addition,
it  depends  on  assumptions  about  the  contemporary  political  situation  in  our
country  that are-to be polite-strangely  out of touch,  even bizarre.
Finally,  though,  I  come  to  a  serious  charge.  It  is  that  the  Populist
sensibility simply  "has  no place"  in  constitutional discourse.  Why?  Because
"constitutionalism"  and populism are absolutely incompatible.  Because the ideas
behind  the two  flatly contradict  one  another.  First of all,  the very  idea  of a
constitution  is  to  establish  some  bedrock  restraints  on ordinary  politics,  fixed
parameters  to channel and  check politics.  Restraint-by-constitution,  moreover,
is an idea  whose power,  whose deep  purity,  we  must preserve.  For ordinary
political energy is, generally,  of terribly  low quality and-even if it presents no
real  threat  of anarchy  or fascism-very  dangerous,  at least  at retail,  as well.
There  is no way  I can  "demonstrate"  the second  portion of the charge  to
be  unfounded.  It is,  I  have  said,  a question  of sensibility,  of one's dominant
take  on  ordinary  political  energy.  All  I  can  do  is  what  I  have  tried  to
95.  This was Alexander Bickel's  most important  insight into judicial review.  BICKEL,  supra
note  61.  Unfortunately, out of this simple insight, he-and his  many followers-spun an academic
fantasy of "dialogue"  or "conversation"  (even of a "seminar")  among  "the  people"  and the  Court.
For a recent and fascinating book in the tradition inaugurated by Bickel,  see ROBERT A.  BURT,  THE
CONSTITUTION  IN CONFLICT  (1992).
96.  Apparently,  many writers in our  "dignified"  field don't stop to control themselves.  In the
past several  years,  I've been called a "nihilist,"  ROBERT  F.  NAGEL,  CONSTITUTIONAL  CULTURES:
THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES  OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  125 n. 19 (1989),  and a "revolutionary,"
BORK,  supra note 35,  at 207  (1990).
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do-encourage you to do a double take,  and then to consider the possibilities of
a reorientation of constitutional discourse  inspired by  a Populist sensibility.  If
I haven't managed  to shake your Anti-Populism, I can only say  that I am sorry.
As to the first portion of the charge,  I have  a sharper answer:  Even if you
feel  a  desire to  believe  in  "constitutionalism"  strong-and-pure,  you  should
recognize  that,  like so many strong desires,  this one can be satisfied only in the
clouds of  fantasy.  There  are  no supra-political  guarantees  of anything.  All
there  is  is  politics.  Politics  already  has  fundamentally  transformed  our
constitutional  law several  times  in this century,  after all.  To expect  the  law  to
control  politics  for  long,  then,  is  to  expect  too  much.  Learned  Hand-who
certainly would reject much of what I've said-made  this point a long time ago:
I  often  wonder  whether  we  do  not  rest  our hopes  too  much  upon
constitutions,  upon  laws  and  upon  courts.  These  are  false  hopes;
believe  me,  these are  false  hopes.  Liberty  lies  in the hearts  of men
and  women;  when  it  dies  there,  no  constitution,  no  law  can  save
it  . . . 97
In  this  sense,  then,  constitutions  are  not  incompatible  with  the  idea  behind
populism.  They  are embedded within  it.
For what  is behind populism is the idea of political  liberty:  liberty  to be
shared  equally  among  all,  not  simply  by  the  "better"  people;  liberty  whose
realization demands exercise and requires energy; liberty to shape,  then reshape,
society.  A  few years ago,  I saw a photograph  taken in Prague  of young people
carrying through the street a bust of Stalin.  Around  Stalin's neck they had hung
a crude  sign.  The sign said:  "Nothing lasts  forever."  I put that photo on  the
first page of my readings  for first semester,  first year law students.  It conveys
the first truth about  the law.
Does this mean that we ought  to have no standards  beyond an affirmation
of  political  liberty?  That,  as  citizens,  we  should  agree  with-or  accept-
whatever  a reinvigorated  majority might do?  Of course not.  That would be to
devalue,  even  to  deny,  our own political  liberty.  The point is  to get  out and
take part  in politics ourselves,  not looking down from a "higher"  pedestal,  but
on the same level with all of the other ordinary people.  That this involves a risk
is obvious.  We are  not sure of victory.  We  may not even be sure of our own
convictions.  But such risk  is inherent in our Constitution.  It is,  Holmes said,
"an  experiment,  as  all  life is an  experiment. "g  Politics  in  a democracy  is an
97.  LEARNED  HAND,  THE  SPIRIT OF LIBERTY  189-90 (1952).
98.  Abrams v.  United  States, 250  U.S.  616,  630 (1919).
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unsettling argument,  an argument  that never  will be settled.
The  same  is true  of constitutional  law.  For  there are constitutions.  But
there is no constitutionalism.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 [1993], Art. 1
http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss3/1